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GETTING BEYOND INTUITION IN THE PROBABLE CAUSE 
INQUIRY 
by 
Erica Goldberg? 
Courts are proudly resigned to the fact that the probable cause inquiry is 
“nontechnical.” In order to conduct a search or make an arrest, police 
need to satisfy the probable cause standard, which the Supreme Court has 
deemed “incapable of precise definition or quantification into 
percentages.” The flexibility of this elusive standard enables courts to 
defer to police officers’ reasonable judgments and expert intuitions in 
unique situations. However, police officers are increasingly using 
investigative techniques that replace their own observational skills with 
test results from some other source, such as drug sniffing dogs, facial 
recognition technology, and DNA matching. The reliability of such 
practices can and should be quantified, but the vagueness of the probable 
cause standard renders it impossible for judges to determine which error 
rates are inconsistent with probable cause.  
 
This Article confronts the intersection between quantifiable evidence and 
the relentlessly fuzzy probable cause standard. It proposes that the 
probable cause standard be assigned a numerical value as a minimum 
threshold, especially in cases where probable cause is based on 
mechanistic techniques that essentially replace a police officer’s own 
judgment. The Article begins by exploring how the police and courts 
currently apply the probable cause standard, including courts’ 
confrontations with probabilities. It then explains why certain evidence 
should require quantified error rates to establish probable cause and how 
to properly calculate these error rates. In the final section, the Article 
argues that assigning a minimum percentage to probable cause would 
add much-needed clarity to the law and protect against systemic abuses. 
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I. Introduction 
Courts are proudly resigned to the fact that the probable cause 
inquiry is “nontechnical.”1 To conduct a search or make an arrest, a 
police officer must establish probable cause based on the totality of the 
circumstances. This approach allows for great flexibility in the 
application of facts to the standard. Adding uncertainty to this flexibility, 
the actual legal standard of probable cause remains undefined. The 
Supreme Court has deemed probable cause “incapable of precise 
definition or quantification into percentages”2 and, just this year, 
overturned the Florida Supreme Court’s efforts to add a more rigorous 
framework to the inquiry.3 Judges, prosecutors, and scholars display 
varying understandings as to the degree of suspicion that probable cause 
requires.4 The deferential standard that reviewing courts apply to 
probable cause determinations further exacerbates the confusion. 
The murkiness of the probable cause standard has many virtues, 
primarily in situations requiring the appraisal of many different facts, 
some tending towards suspicion and some undermining it. A flexible 
standard allows police to rely on their expertise, intuition, and 
 
1 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)). 
2 Id. at 371. 
3 Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1053 (2013). 
4 See infra Part II.C. 
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observational skills to decide whether suspicious behavior warrants 
further action, without the constraints of a rigid test. In complex cases, 
quantification of the standard by assigning it a numerical percentage 
would obscure the true, qualitative nature of the inquiry and create a 
false sense of precision.5 Plus, judges, concerned about institutional 
incompetence, may simply be “afraid of math.”6 
There is a subset of cases, however, where the virtues of the 
imprecise definition of probable cause all but disappear. Consider a real 
case where Moose the drug detection dog, undergoing a training 
exercise at a storage facility, alerted to the presence of drugs in one of 
the storage bins where the police had not planted drugs.7 The police 
sought to obtain a warrant to search the locker based solely on Moose’s 
alert and the fact that that the lessee of the storage bin, whose name was 
given to police after Moose’s alert, had a prior record of drug 
convictions.8 Whether or not probable cause exists to issue the warrant 
depends largely on Moose’s reliability, which can be quantified based on 
Moose’s error rate in detecting drugs. 
There are an increasing number of situations, like the one involving 
Moose, where the police rely on machines or tools (such as a dog) to 
create their suspicion.9 As a result, the likelihood of criminal activity can 
be quantified. In such situations, the virtues of having an undefined 
probable cause standard are outweighed by its vices, including the lack of 
uniformity in application and susceptibility to abuse. In cases where the 
critical evidence at issue is produced through a mechanistic process, 
where police essentially outsource their intuition, this Article argues that 
reasonable officers cannot differ greatly on the strength of the evidence, 
and the arguments opposing quantifying the probable cause standard are 
not compelling. Further, even in cases where the evidence demonstrating 
probable cause cannot be quantified, having a well-defined legal 
standard does not detract from the discretion and flexibility the police 
would have in assessing the totality of the circumstances of the facts of a 
case. 
 
5 Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause, in The Political 
Heart of Criminal Procedure: Essays on Themes of William J. Stuntz 131, 131–
32 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012) (discussing how quantifying probable cause 
would lead to less accurate probable cause determinations by undermining a judge’s 
logical intuition). 
6 Id. at 132 (joking that this is one reason for the refusal to quantify the 
probable cause standard). If judges are afraid of math, this is perhaps rightfully so. 
See infra Part III for a discussion of the difficulties involved in incorporating statistical 
evidence into the probable cause inquiry. 
7 United States v. Cook, 904 F.2d 37, *1–2 (6th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-5947) 
(unpublished disposition). 
8 Id. 
9 Dogs are considered tools like other machines used by the police or 
forensic scientists. See Colin Miller, Hear Spot Bark: Washington Court of Appeals Rejects 
Argument that Dog Barking Constitutes Hearsay, EvidenceProf Blog (Nov. 15, 2007), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2007/11/hear-spot-bark-.html. 
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Currently, the probable cause inquiry provides room for reasonable 
officers to differ on the strength of their suspicion. Courts making 
probable cause assessments consider whether the facts and circumstances 
warrant a person of “‘reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has 
been or is being committed.”10 When a magistrate judge undertakes the 
probable cause inquiry to determine whether a warrant should issue, she 
must decide only if there is a “fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”11 Later, if 
contraband or evidence of a crime is found, the reviewing court at the 
criminal trial need only “ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial 
basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.”12 
At these increasingly deferential levels of inquiry, it is unclear what 
degree of suspicion is required before a magistrate can ratify an officer’s 
judgment of probable cause.13 Does a reasonable police officer have to 
“believe” by greater than 50% that a crime is being committed? And, do 
we look at whether any reasonable officer could believe by greater than 
50% in the existence of criminal activity? Then, in defining a “fair 
probability,” should magistrate judges allow some band of error around 
their own determination of 50% likelihood to provide room for 
reasonable police officers to differ? If a magistrate judge himself deems 
that there is an approximately 35% chance that evidence could be found 
in a home, but appreciates that reasonable officers could believe the 
chance to be 60%, should the warrant issue? Further, does the substantial 
basis review of a magistrate’s decision place an even broader band 
around a police officer’s greater than 50% belief that a crime is 
occurring so as to allow for reasonable magistrate judges to differ? 
Courts have not confronted these questions. Yet, as technology 
progresses, more tools are available that replace a police officer’s 
intuition and judgment with mechanistic findings, where the degree of 
suspicion can and should be quantified.14 Courts have determined, for 
example, that both positive alerts from drug sniffing dogs and fingerprint 
matches are sufficient on their own, without any other evidence, to satisfy 
probable cause.15 To establish that a police officer reasonably relied on 
 
10 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (quoting Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
11 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
12 Id. at 238–39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). 
Not all courts fashion these standards the same way. See Cook, 904 F.2d 37, *2; infra 
Part II.C. 
13 See infra Part II.C. 
14 According to one scholar, “just on the horizon” are “handheld gun 
detectors, software protocols that sift through e-mails searching for illegal material, or 
facial recognition technology.” Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. 
Caballes: How To Make the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 411, 413 (2005). 
15 See, e.g., Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013) (“If a bona fide 
organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a 
court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog’s alert 
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these types of techniques, quantifiable error rates are often incorporated 
into the probable cause inquiry. Some courts have even held that certain 
investigative techniques must be assessed using quantified error rates.16 
Once the reliability of practices like the use of drug sniffing dogs, 
fingerprint analysis, partial DNA matching,17 or facial recognition 
technology is quantified, however, the vagueness of the probable cause 
standard renders it impossible to determine which, if any, error rates are 
inconsistent with probable cause. Police cannot predict whether a 
particular investigative technique is reliable enough on its own to satisfy 
the probable cause inquiry. Judges do not know if probable cause 
requires a 40%, 50%, or 51% likelihood that a suspect has committed or 
will commit a particular crime.18 Our privacy rights vary not only because 
judges and police officers assess facts differently, an unavoidable and 
often beneficial consequence of a system administered by human beings, 
but also because they are using different legal standards. This creates a 
system prone to inconsistency and vulnerable to abuse. 
 
provides probable cause to search.”); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 
1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (“It is undisputed that a drug sniffing dog’s detection of 
contraband in itself establishes probable cause for a search warrant.”); United States 
v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370, 372 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a drug sniffing dog’s 
positive alert to the smell of contraband in luggage “itself establish[es] probable 
cause, enough for the arrest, more than enough for the stop”); People v. Moon, 
No. 1-09-3106, 2011 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 745, at *7 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 26, 2011) 
(“The evidence at trial established that the police had probable cause to arrest 
defendant when they determined that the kitchen window was the point of entry, 
gathered finger and palm prints from the outside of the kitchen window that was 
behind a storm window, determined that the prints belonged to defendant and 
ascertained from Turner that she did not know defendant or give him permission to 
enter her residence.”). 
16 Recently, the Florida Supreme Court held that a positive alert by a 
certified drug sniffing dog does not presumptively establish probable cause to 
conduct a search, and accuracy rates are needed to assess a dog’s reliability. Harris v. 
State, 71 So. 3d 756, 758–59 (Fla. 2011). This decision was reversed by the Supreme 
Court in an opinion reaffirming the flexible, “totality of the circumstances” test 
applied to all probable cause determinations. See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1055. The 
Court’s unanimous opinion, which presumes that sufficient training and certification 
render a dog sniff reliable enough to establish probable cause, id. at 1056–59, 
fundamentally misunderstands the problems inherent in relying on false positive 
rates and recognizing alerts of “residual odors” as correct alerts. See infra Part III.C. 
Cf. State v. Anez, 738 N.E.2d 491, 497 (Ohio Com. Pl. 2000) (excluding evidence of a 
field breath sobriety test because “the results of a scientific test may not be introduced 
unless there is foundational testimony that the device used was operating with a 
sufficient degree of accuracy”). 
17 DNA matching is most relevant to the probable cause inquiry in the 
context of partial matching of DNA found at a crime scene to DNA in a databank, 
thus implicating possible family members of the person whose DNA has been stored 
in the databank. See infra Part III.B; see generally Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial 
Searches of DNA Databases, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 291 (2010). 
18 Some judges have held that probable cause is satisfied even when error 
rates were between 40% and 50%. United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 955 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (probable cause established despite dog’s error rate close to 50%). 
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This Article argues that when quantifiable evidence is the primary 
basis for an officer’s suspicion, that evidence should be held to a 
minimum threshold of required certainty. Although scholars have 
touched upon whether fallible tools like drug sniffing dogs and facial 
recognition technology can yield evidence that satisfies the probable 
cause standard19 and have debated the appropriate level of flexibility with 
which probable cause should be defined,20 this Article confronts the 
intersection of probabilistic evidence and the probable cause standard 
and proposes assigning a numerical value to the probable cause standard 
in cases where error rates are largely dispositive of the probable cause 
inquiry. 
Part II of the Article details how the police and courts currently 
apply the concept of probable cause, and how the increasingly 
deferential standard of review used to assess probable cause contributes 
to the standard’s elusiveness. Part II also explores how probabilistic 
evidence is currently incorporated into the probable cause inquiry. Part 
III contends that certain evidence should demand quantified error rates 
to establish probable cause. This section argues that statistical evidence is 
necessary to establish probable cause for investigative techniques that 
essentially replace a police officer’s own judgment, skill, and intuition. 
Part III further analyzes how to calculate error rates in a way most 
relevant to the probable cause inquiry and exposes the limitations of 
quantification of evidence. 
In the final section, the Article addresses how courts might 
incorporate quantifiable evidence into the probable cause inquiry. In 
cases in which quantifiable evidence is the critical factor in satisfying 
probable cause, assigning a numerical value to probable cause would add 
uniformity to the law and would better protect Fourth Amendment 
interests. In cases where quantifiable evidence is presented along with 
other qualitative evidence tending towards suspicion, judges can 
 
19 Douglas A. Fretty, Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth for Fourth 
Amendment Rights in Public Places, 16 Va. J.L. & Tech. 430, 459–62 (2011) (discussing 
the “tolerable error” in the context of drug sniffing dogs, field sobriety tests, and faci-
al recognition technology); Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and Probable Cause, 14 
Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 1, 12–18 (2006) (using Bayes’ Rule to demonstrate that a posi-
tive alert by a drug sniffing dog cannot be sufficient on its own to establish probable 
cause). 
20 E.g., Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 
569, 586 (2007) (“Mathematics . . . will fail us in our pursuit of a definition for proba-
ble cause, and, indeed, we should fear any attempt to co-opt mathematical concepts 
to solve the probable cause riddle.”); Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The 
Odds on Probable Cause, 74 Miss. L.J. 279, 338 (2004) (exploring the tension between 
the precision of mathematics and the appeal of intuition in defining the probable 
cause standard and creating a “tiered model of the levels of certainty required for 
searches and seizures”); Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to 
the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 465, 469 (1984) (preferring a 
“commonsense approach to probable cause”); Kerr, supra note 5 (arguing that prob-
able cause should not be quantified). 
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qualitatively assess any suspicion created by a police officer’s 
observational skills, but will know whether or not the quantifiable 
evidence comes close to meeting the probable cause hurdle. Finally, 
when quantifiable evidence is not presented as part of the probable cause 
inquiry, judges can adhere to prior case law without quantifying the 
inquiry. While confronting the arguments against quantifying probable 
cause, the final section further offers insights into selecting a number 
that is easy to conceptualize and proposes alternative solutions to 
quantifying probable cause. 
II. The Elusive Probable Cause Inquiry 
“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect 
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the 
State.”21 The probable cause standard is so significant because it serves as 
the gatekeeper between individuals and these unwarranted intrusions. 
Yet, the standard has not been defined with sufficient precision.22 An 
examination of the role that probable cause plays in regulating 
governmental intrusions of various types is first necessary to understand 
why probable cause requires flexibility in applying the facts but greater 
precision in defining the legal standard. 
The standard’s elusiveness is exacerbated by relatively recent 
decisions diminishing judicial review of probable cause determinations. 
Quantifying the standard is now a more urgently needed solution. 
Although the Supreme Court has held that the probable cause standard is 
incapable of quantification, courts already incorporate quantifiable 
evidence into the inquiry; they are just not doing so in a standardized way. 
A. Probable Cause as the Referee Between Privacy and Security 
In the Fourth Amendment context, probable cause is particularly 
important because it resolves particular issues in the ubiquitous tension 
between individual liberty and public security/crime prevention. Serious 
intrusions on privacy and liberty are unconstitutional when undertaken 
without probable cause, and the evidence obtained as a result of the 
intrusion is often suppressed at trial.23 If probable cause exists, however, 
the need to protect the public and enforce the laws permits more serious 
intrusions. 
Probable cause serves as the referee between privacy and security 
because the Fourth Amendment protects individuals only from 
 
21 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
22 See infra Part II.C. 
23 The exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment be excluded from admission at trial, although the exclusionary 
rule has several exceptions. United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(discussing the exclusionary rule and its “limits”). 
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“unreasonable searches and seizures.”24 In defining whether a search or 
arrest is reasonable, courts look to the degree of suspicion motivating the 
police and the degree of intrusion into the individual’s privacy or liberty. 
For full searches and arrests by the police, probable cause is usually the 
requisite level of suspicion.25 To establish probable cause, police need not 
demonstrate a certainty that criminal activity is afoot, or that evidence 
will be found in a particular place, but only a “fair probability” of a 
successful search or seizure.26 This fair probability remains a mystery, but 
courts have consistently held that probable cause “exists if a law 
enforcement official, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, has 
sufficient knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information to justify a 
person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been or is 
being committed.”27 
The most serious intrusions into an individual’s privacy require not 
only probable cause but also the prior blessing of the courts. This court 
intervention provides extra protection against unreasonable searches 
because a neutral magistrate judge is deemed more capable of making a 
probable cause determination than a police officer, who has a stake in 
the outcome of each case.28 Searches or arrests that occur inside an 
individual’s home require a magistrate judge to render the probable 
cause determination and issue a warrant prior to the search or seizure.29 
Other types of searches are considered intrusive enough to require 
probable cause, but exigencies or diminished expectations of privacy 
render it unnecessary for the police to first obtain a warrant. The 
“automobile exception” permits police to search a vehicle on a public 
 
24 U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
25 See United States v. $149,442.43 in U.S. Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 876 
(10th Cir. 1992) (“The test for determining probable cause for forfeiture purposes is 
the same as applies in arrests, searches and seizures.”). 
26 See Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing the 
probable cause standard). 
27 United States v. Gagnon, 373 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 2004). 
28 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 353 (1986) (“By requiring that conclu-
sions concerning probable cause . . . ‘be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime,’ we minimize the risk of unreasonable assertions of executive au-
thority.” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)) (citation omit-
ted)). 
29 See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1865 (2011) (“In no quarter does 
the Fourth Amendment apply with greater force than in our homes, our most private 
space which, for centuries, has been regarded as ‘entitled to special protection.’” 
(quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006))); Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the en-
trance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably 
be crossed without a warrant.”). The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment pro-
vides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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road without a warrant, so long as probable cause is satisfied.30 Arrests in 
public are permissible without a warrant.31 Police make these probable 
cause determinations themselves, but they are reviewed later if evidence 
found as a result of the search is used in a criminal trial.32 
B. The Role of Probable Cause When Less Suspicion Is Required 
Although probable cause is the critical standard for the most 
intrusive searches, there are other categories of searches and seizures 
that are constitutionally permitted based on less suspicion or justification. 
Even in these contexts, however, the probable cause standard is 
important, either for setting the bar against which courts measure 
“reasonable suspicion,” the level of suspicion needed for less intrusive 
searches, or for preventing intrusions that are not considered searches 
from becoming full searches. 
A “reasonable suspicion” justifies brief detentions and superficial pat-
downs of individuals over their clothing,33 searches of students in public 
schools,34 and searches of parolees’ homes.35 Because lesser degrees of 
suspicion are also considered “not ‘readily, or even usefully, reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules,’”36 courts define reasonable suspicion in relation to 
probable cause. Reasonable suspicion requires some degree of certainty, 
which is less than probable cause, and police must articulate the grounds 
for that suspicion.37 
 
30 Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (discussing the “automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement”). 
31 United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 268 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[L]aw en-
forcement officials may arrest an individual in a public place without a warrant if they 
have probable cause to believe that the individual committed a felony.”). 
32 More information on how courts review probable cause determinations is 
presented infra Part II.C. 
33 United States v. Madrid, 30 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th Cir. 1994) (discussing 
a stop permitted by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which “in-
volv[es] only a brief, non-intrusive detention and frisk for weapons when officers have 
a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed a crime or is about to do 
so”). 
34 Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, 379 F.3d 358, 370 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Un-
der the ‘special needs’ doctrine, a search of a particular student, with the exception 
of drug testing, must be supported by reasonable suspicion.”). 
35 United States v. Loney, 331 F.3d 516, 520–21 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is now 
beyond question that a state statute survives Fourth Amendment scrutiny if it author-
izes searches of parolees based on a reasonable suspicion that an individual is violat-
ing the terms or conditions of parole.”). 
36 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). In a 1981 survey, 164 federal judges provided responses 
revealing that they quantified reasonable suspicion at an average certainty of 31%. See 
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional 
Guarantees?, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1293, 1324–25, 1328 (1982). 
37 See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (holding that the certainty needed to satisfy rea-
sonable suspicion “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance 
of the evidence” and less than the “fair probability” needed to satisfy probable cause). 
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Other types of government intrusions, due to heightened 
governmental interests or diminished privacy interests, either require no 
individualized suspicion or are not even considered searches that 
implicate Fourth Amendment protections.38 In those cases, the probable 
cause inquiry prevents the police from converting a superficial intrusion 
into a greater intrusion. 
One category of non-search that has great import for the probable 
cause inquiry, because it yields results that are usually more susceptible to 
quantification, is the so-called “binary search.” A binary search reveals 
only the presence or absence of illegal substances.39 The Supreme Court 
has held that individuals do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in contraband, so intrusions that reveal only the presence or absence of 
drugs, if conducted in ways that do not seriously implicate privacy 
interests or physically intrude upon constitutionally protected areas, do 
not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.40 When an agent of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration tested a small amount of white powder for 
cocaine, for example, it was not considered a search or a seizure.41 The 
police may also use drug sniffing dogs to search for scents in public 
places, such as outside a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop42 or the 
exterior of luggage at an airport,43 without triggering the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The major intrusion to privacy from using binary technology occurs 
after the technology has produced a positive alert. Police either conduct 
a full search themselves or obtain a warrant from a magistrate judge on 
the basis of the positive alert, but probable cause must be satisfied. Thus, 
the Fourth Amendment Analysis requires the judge to determine 
whether the positive alert provides the police with probable cause to 
 
In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), the Supreme Court explained that rea-
sonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity and 
less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 
38 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (upholding 
school’s suspicionless testing of student athletes); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989) (upholding mandatory urinalysis tests of employees 
who work for the United States Customs Service). 
39 The term “binary” refers to the fact that the search reveals either a “yes” or 
a “no” answer to the question of whether illegal substances are present and does not 
reveal any other potentially personal information. Simmons, supra note 14, at 413. 
40 Binary searches may trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny if performed in 
a physically intrusive way. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–17 (2013). 
41 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (“A chemical test that 
merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compro-
mise any legitimate interest in privacy.”). 
42 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). 
43 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[W]e conclude that the 
particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here—exposure 
of respondent’s luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine—
did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). Part of 
the rationale in Place was that a sniff of a closed suitcase did not reveal the contents of 
that suitcase, and was therefore minimally intrusive. Id. at 706–07. 
2013] GETTING BEYOND INTUITION  799 
search further. A “false positive”44 alert to an area that does not contain 
drugs may ultimately reveal items and information in which individuals 
do have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and forces individuals to 
submit to prolonged interaction with the police.45 
The probable cause standard thus protects the public from serious 
intrusions upon privacy, sets a standard against which reasonable 
suspicion is measured, and prevents binary searches from automatically 
becoming full-scale searches. However, at all levels of review, the level of 
confidence needed to satisfy the probable cause standard is unknown, 
rendering it vulnerable to erosion and abuse. 
C.  Uncertainty in the Probable Cause Standard Throughout the Stages of Review 
Currently, courts apply a “nontechnical conception”46 of probable 
cause at all levels of review, allowing for flexibility in application of the 
standard but providing little guidance for police officers and magistrate 
judges. The result is, as one scholar noted, that “[a]lthough the Court 
has stressed the importance of a ‘single uniform standard’ of probable 
cause for criminal investigatory conduct, it has not defined that standard 
in a manner that is particularly illuminating to those charged with 
enforcing and interpreting the criminal law.”47 Relatively recent 
developments in Fourth Amendment law have compounded this 
problem because they have undermined judicial review of probable cause 
determinations, making it even more necessary to clarify the standard. 
As mentioned above, law enforcement officers must make practical 
commonsense judgments in areas of uncertainty, when they do not know 
if a suspect is actually committing a crime. Because police officers are 
not, as the Supreme Court often reminds us, “legal technicians,”48 the 
probable cause standard must allow police officers to make educated 
guesses. If such a guess is reasonable but incorrect, and the police 
ultimately find either no evidence of the criminal activity they were 
looking for or evidence of entirely unrelated criminal activity,49 then the 
 
44 A false positive occurs when the search technology indicates the presence 
of criminal activity incorrectly. For a more detailed explanation, see infra Part III.C. 
45 For this reason, Justice Souter dissented in Caballes, which held that the 
use of drug sniffing dogs at routine traffic stops is not a search. 543 U.S. at 411 (Sout-
er, J., dissenting) (“The infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction.”). 
46 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
47 Barry Jeffrey Stern, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 
1385, 1436–37 n.172 (1994) (citation omitted). Professor Ronald Bacigal had de-
scribed probable cause as a “fixed, but undefined, percentage.” Bacigal, supra note 
20, at 324. 
48 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983). 
49 See United States v. Biglow, 562 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Prob-
able cause ‘requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity,’ ra-
ther than an actual showing of such activity.” (quoting New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 
475 U.S. 868, 877–78 (1986))). 
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standard must also provide room for courts to defer to a police officer’s 
expertise,50 but prevent unreasonable intrusions.51 
To accommodate the myriad interactions between police and 
individuals without creating rules that unduly stifle a police officer’s 
exercise of her intuition, courts generally assess probable cause given the 
totality of the circumstances.52 This flexibility allows courts to take all of 
the facts into account and make an intuitive judgment when issuing a 
warrant or upholding a search instead of having to strictly adhere to rigid 
rules about what constitutes probable cause.53 For example, the totality-
of-the-circumstances test that governs whether an informant’s tip can 
supply probable cause balances factors like the reliability of the 
informant, the basis for the informant’s information, and the extent to 
which the police have corroborated the tip.54 A judge may disregard the 
fact that a confidential informant’s criminal record or drug addiction 
undermines her reliability if other factors point towards her 
truthfulness.55 There are many ways to interpret the same set of facts, and 
an innocent explanation for the evidence presented does not necessarily 
negate probable cause.56 
With great flexibility, however, comes great uncertainty.57 The 
Supreme Court has remarked that “[r]easonable minds frequently may 
differ on the question whether a particular [warrant] affidavit establishes 
 
50 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (“[O]ur cases have 
recognized that a police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in 
deciding whether probable cause exists.”). According to the Supreme Court in Or-
nelas, where a layperson might conclude that a “loose panel below the back seat arm-
rest in [an] automobile . . . may suggest only wear and tear, . . . to [a police officer], 
who had searched roughly 2,000 cars for narcotics, it suggested that drugs may be se-
creted inside the panel.” Id. 
51 See supra Part II.A. 
52 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
53 Professor Ronald Bacigal noted that scholars opposed to prescribing 
precise mathematical rules to govern the probable cause inquiry “prefer to trust the 
subjective judgment of experienced decision makers who evaluate each individual 
situation in light of accumulated experience” and “rely on perceptions that they can-
not articulate as explicit rules or mathematical probabilities.” Bacigal, supra note 20, 
at 305. 
54 Gates, 462 U.S. at 230–34. 
55 United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 415 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The mag-
istrate was thus presented with specific details of a crime; neither Brown’s drug addic-
tion nor criminal record warranted disregarding her report. Although an informant’s 
reliability is a factor to be considered by a court, it is just one relevant consideration 
in the totality of the circumstances analysis.”). 
56 United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1985). 
57 See Bacigal, supra note 20, at 339 (discussing the “unacceptable complexi-
ty of balancing the totality of the circumstances”). See generally Symeon C. Symeoni-
des, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 227, 238 (2010) (“The tension between the need for legal certainty and 
predictability, on the one hand, and the desire for flexible, equitable, individualized 
solutions on the other, is as old as law itself.”). 
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probable cause.”58 Scholars have noted “wildly different outcomes” based 
on similar fact patterns when determining probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion.59 Part of the problem is that no one knows how 
high a hurdle the standard actually presents. The Supreme Court 
explicitly refuses to assign probable cause a numerical value, equating it 
instead to a “fair probability” that evidence will be found.60 Judges, 
scholars, and practitioners hold varying views as to the burden imposed 
by probable cause, with the largest number of judges clustering in the 
range between 30% and 60%.61 Disagreement among scholars and 
practitioners even exists as to whether probable cause is a lighter or 
equivalent burden to the preponderance of the evidence standard.62 
The recognition that reasonable minds may easily differ on whether 
probable cause is satisfied often makes reviewing courts loathe to second-
guess probable cause determinations by either the police or magistrate 
 
58 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984). 
59 Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the 
Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 99, 
121–22 (1999) (“In a high crime area, sitting in a car in a parking lot late at night 
may create reasonable suspicion [to detain someone] in Georgia, but not in 
Tennessee, and standing on a street corner may create reasonable suspicion in 
Louisiana, but not in Pennsylvania, even though these jurisdictions apply the same 
standard.” (footnotes omitted)). 
60 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 238 (1983); see Florida v. Harris, 133 
S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013). 
61 In the survey of federal judges in 1981, mentioned supra note 36, 166 
provided responses revealing that they quantify “probable cause to believe,” on 
average, at 45.78%. Two judges even associated probable cause with 10% and one 
judge with 90%. See McCauliff, supra note 36, at 1324–25, 1327. Most of the judges 
believed probable cause was around 40% or 50%, but 52 of the judges thought 
probable cause was either around 30% or around 60%. Id. at 1327. 
62 See, e.g., 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment § 3.2(e), at 60–64 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing cases and commen-
taries indicating that probable cause does not mean “more-probable-than-not”); John 
H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the 
Right To Present a Defense, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1069, 1104 n.240 (2007) (“Probable 
cause does not mean more probable than not.”); Christopher Slobogin, Government 
Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 329 (2008) (describing 
probable cause as “a level of certainty akin to the civil preponderance standard”); 
Kimberly A. Burdge, Comment, Legislating the Fourth Amendment: Can Congressional Leg-
islation Make the Unconstitutional Legal?, 50 How. L.J. 899, 901 (2007) (“[A] more de-
tailed, modern version of probable cause would not necessarily require a more likely 
than not scenario.”). One particular federal prosecutor told his supervisee that prob-
able cause meant 40%, Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth Amendment: 
Toward an Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 
641, 680 (2005), but an attorney for the FBI believed that “probable cause 
mean[t] . . . more likely than not, or if quantified, a 51% likelihood,” Daniel Richman, 
Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 783 
(2003) (quoting Memorandum from Coleen Rowley to Robert Mueller, FBI Director 
(May 21, 2002)). A plurality of the Supreme Court has stated that the probable cause 
standard “does not demand any showing that such a belief [of criminal wrongdoing] be 
correct or more likely true than false.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). 
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judges.63 This has led to increasingly deferential review of probable cause 
decisions, which then in turn contributes to the elusiveness of the 
probable cause standard. For example, in the case of searches where a 
warrant is required, the police affidavit must contain information 
allowing a person of reasonable caution to believe that evidence will be 
found in the place to be searched.64 Then, the magistrate judge must find 
that, “given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place.”65 Great deference is later given to the magistrate’s 
issuance of a warrant by a reviewing court,66 which determines whether 
the magistrate’s decision is supported by “a substantial basis.”67 
This deference, combined with a vague standard, does not promote 
uniformity in magistrate judges’ decisions.68 The deference might be 
appropriate if reviewing courts were simply deferring to a magistrate 
judge’s assessment as to whether the facts at issue, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, surpassed a known probable cause threshold. 
However, because the probable cause hurdle is so vague, reviewing courts 
cannot know the degree of suspicion on which the magistrate judge 
relied in issuing a warrant.69 Is that magistrate basing his ruling on the 
 
63 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (holding that a 
magistrate’s issuance of a warrant is entitled to “great deference” due to the strong 
preference for warrants and the reality of “doubtful or marginal case[s]” (quoting 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969))); United States v. Ventresca, 380 
U.S. 102, 106 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
64 See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 593 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
65 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
66 See United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A magistrate’s 
determination of probable cause is entitled to great deference by reviewing courts.”).  
67 Id. In Allen, the court made clear that the duty of a reviewing court is 
simply to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis for concluding that 
probable cause existed.” Id. at 834; see, e.g., United States v. McClellan, 350 F. App’x 
767, 769 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Our review of the initial probable cause determination, 
however, is deferential as we scrutinize the affidavit to determine if ‘there is a sub-
stantial basis for a fair probability’ that the wiretaps would obtain communications 
regarding illegal drug transactions.” (quoting United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 
1205 (3d Cir. 1993))); United States v. Reed, 195 F. App’x 815, 822 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“A reviewing court should accord great deference to a magistrate’s determination of 
probable cause; its duty is ‘simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis 
for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.’ This deference is appropriate to 
further the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for warrants.” (quoting Gates, 462 
U.S. at 238–39) (citation omitted)). 
68 The Supreme Court has warned against too much deference to a trial 
court’s probable cause determination, remarking that “[a] policy of sweeping defer-
ence would permit, ‘[i]n the absence of any significant difference in the facts,’ ‘the 
Fourth Amendment’s incidence [to] tur[n] on whether different trial judges draw 
general conclusions that the facts are sufficient or insufficient to constitute probable 
cause.’ Such varied results would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of 
law.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. 
160, 171 (1949)) (citation omitted). 
69 In his excellent piece on the tension between a statistical versus an intuitive 
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fact that a reasonable officer has to believe that evidence will be found by 
greater than 50%, and a “fair probability” determination by the 
magistrate judge allows for some room for disagreement among 
reasonable police officers?70 Reviewing courts, which decide whether a 
“substantial basis” supports the magistrate’s decision,71 do not even know 
how much suspicion the magistrate believed was required before 
rendering his decision. 
The probable cause standard’s imprecision at various levels of review 
is also partially responsible for the “good-faith exception” to the 
exclusionary rule,72 which, in turn, contributes to the indeterminacy of 
the standard. Although the exclusionary rule requires the “fruits” of 
unlawful searches to be suppressed at trial, the good faith exception 
permits the admission of evidence found pursuant to a search warrant 
not supported by probable cause, so long as law enforcement reasonably 
relied on the warrant.73 A reviewing court can therefore find under 
certain circumstances that even if a substantial basis did not exist for the 
magistrate’s determination, any evidence found may still form the basis 
of a criminal conviction.74 The good faith exception means all evidence 
found pursuant to a warrant will be admitted unless the warrant is “so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable.”75 
The good faith exception thus almost entirely insulates a magistrate 
judge’s issuance of a warrant from review at the trial or appellate levels. 
Many reviewing courts simply find that the good faith exception applies 
 
approach to probable cause, Ronald Bacigal argues that the Supreme Court has 
maintained the “fiction” that probable cause is a “single, familiar standard” that 
applies equally to every crime. Bacigal, supra note 20, at 323–24 (quoting Dunaway v. 
New York, 422 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)). According to Bacigal, “[t]his rigid view of 
probable cause requires the police to pinpoint their level of certainty to some fixed, 
but undefined, percentage.” Id. 
70 At least one court has even conflated the standards at various levels of 
review, holding that probable cause exists if a reasonable person could “believe there 
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in a par-
ticular place.” United States v. Fladten, 230 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 2000). 
71 See supra Part I. 
72 Police are permitted to rely on a search warrant, even if later found lack-
ing in probable cause, where a search warrant affidavit “provided evidence sufficient 
to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence 
of probable cause.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). 
73 The Supreme Court has held that the good faith exception does not 
apply to a search warrant if the police lied to procure the warrant, or the warrant was 
so lacking in probable cause that the magistrate judge essentially rubber-stamped a 
warrant request. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 921–24 (“Penalizing the officer for the 
magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence 
of Fourth Amendment violations.”). 
74 United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2002) (allowing the 
admission of evidence even if “it is clear that . . . Agent Peterson’s affidavit does not 
provide a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause”). 
75 Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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without considering whether the warrant was supported by probable 
cause.76 This stymies the development of the law surrounding the 
probable cause standard in favor of admission of a great deal more 
evidence.77 Given that the review of a magistrate judge’s probable cause 
determination is already so deferential, it is difficult to determine in a 
particular case if probable cause is actually lacking unless it is so 
obviously lacking that a court must exclude the evidence despite the 
good faith exception. 
Although Leon’s exception applies only in the warrant context, one 
scholar has found that searches conducted pursuant to warrants are 
much more likely to produce evidence than searches conducted where 
no warrant is required.78 Leon’s good faith exception, and its progeny,79 
may lead to an erosion of the extra protections that warrants offer.80 The 
good faith exception focuses on what a reasonable officer would believe, 
not whether the probable cause standard was actually met based on the 
warrant application,81 thereby bypassing the magistrate’s oversight as 
intermediary between law enforcement’s own determination of probable 
cause and the resulting search.82 
Unscrupulous or overextended police officers and magistrate judges 
can easily exploit the uncertainty in the probable cause standard, 
 
76 E.g., United States v. Houston, 665 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 2012) (“A 
court may consider whether the good-faith exception applies before conducting 
probable cause analysis.”). 
77 Indeed, as the dissent in Leon predicted, “After today’s decisions, there 
will be little reason for reviewing courts to conduct such a conscientious review [of 
the probable cause determination]; rather, these courts will be more likely to focus 
simply on the question of police good faith.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 956–57 n.15 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
78 One scholar examined available empirical data to conclude that searches 
pursuant to warrants recover evidence at rates that may exceed 80%. The recovery 
rate on warrantless searches, even when police allege probable cause, is significantly 
less, perhaps as low as 12%. Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back Into Probable Cause, 
87 Tex. L. Rev. 913, 923–24 (2009). 
79 E.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (extending Leon’s 
good faith exception to a situation where police negligence led to an arrest pursuant 
to a revoked warrant). 
80 See, e.g., Houston, 665 F.3d at 995–96 (upholding police officers’ reliance 
on a search warrant based on the “common sense appeal” of the inference that 
because defendant molested a child and looked at child pornography six years ago, 
he might have child pornography on his current computer at a different location 
(quoting United States v. Perry, 531 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 2008))). 
81 In fact, in applying the good faith exception, some courts consider in-
formation known to the police officer that was inadvertently omitted from the war-
rant application. See United States v. McKenzie-Gude, 671 F.3d 452, 460–61 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
82 See United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 413 (7th Cir. 1990) (discuss-
ing the “far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the arrest or 
search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight 
judgment” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (internal quotation mark 
omitted))). 
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especially when combined with the exceptional deference offered to the 
initial probable cause determination.83 Given the lack of oversight over 
probable cause decisions, the flexibility afforded by the current 
application of the probable cause standard may not always be a virtue, 
and may place too much discretion in the hands of police officers at the 
expense of privacy interests.84 According to Professor Ronald Bacigal, 
“[t]he inability to formulate clear rules or precise probability levels 
governing probable cause has lead [sic] the Court to adopt one over-
arching rule for the police—just use your common sense and act 
reasonably.”85 To some extent, this standard contravenes the purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment, which is to limit police discretion.86 Although 
reasonableness is part of the standard, an undefined legal hurdle leads to 
variability in how much suspicion is deemed “reasonable,” allowing for 
perhaps unjustified amounts of police discretion. 
While there is ample reason to allow great flexibility in application of 
the facts to the probable cause standard, there is less justification for 
preserving a vague, undefined legal standard. This is especially true 
because courts are already incorporating probabilities into the probable 
cause inquiry. 
D. Confrontations with Probability 
Part of the reason that courts are loathe to attach rules or numbers 
to the probable cause inquiry is a concern that a “probabilistic” approach 
to probable cause would replace detective work that yields individualized 
suspicion.87 This type of probabilistic approach, some fear, would 
 
83 Although many scholars assume that most police officers would not 
abuse their power to establish probable cause, empirical evidence indicates a serious 
problem with perjury in warrant affidavits. See Stephen W. Gard, Bearing False Witness: 
Perjured Affidavits and the Fourth Amendment, 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 445, 447–48 (2008). 
Clarifying the probable cause standard or applying a more stringent standard of 
review would not solve the problem of perjury, but it would impede police attempts 
to establish probable cause where none exists, which police might prefer to outright 
lying. 
84 Scholars have commented that the cynical explanation for flexible or in-
consistent Fourth Amendment standards is to make it easier for police to conduct 
searches without worrying about constitutional protections. E.g., Susan F. Mandiberg, 
Reasonable Officers vs. Reasonable Lay Persons in the Supreme Court’s Miranda and Fourth 
Amendment Cases, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1481, 1525 (2010) (“So why should police 
not be held to higher standards suitable to the trained professionals they presumably 
are? . . . The cynical answer is that lower courts would be more likely to find a Fourth 
Amendment or Miranda violation if police were held to a higher standard . . . than is 
currently the case.”). 
85 Bacigal, supra note 20, at 318. 
86 Id. at 320. 
87 See id. at 297 (“An unavoidable feature of probabilistic thinking is that it 
treats people as members of a group rather than as individuals. Some commentators 
suggest that this focus violates an ethical command to treat citizens as unique individu-
als and to judge them only on evidence about their own conduct or matters within their 
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penalize people based on group attributes instead of individual 
characteristics.88 Yet, this is not the only way probabilities have been 
incorporated into the probable cause inquiry. Courts also review 
probabilities relevant to individualized suspicion, which is not as 
problematic as finding probable cause based on group statistics. These 
two types of probabilistic evidence—data that measures group attributes 
and data that gives rise to individualized suspicion—have different roles 
in the probable cause inquiry, and both illustrate how courts evaluate 
statistical evidence in assessing probable cause. 
1. Background Attributes and Group Statistics 
Many courts and scholars have expressed an aversion to using non-
individualized statistical information to sanction intrusive police conduct 
or treat people as potential criminals.89 For example, presence in a high-
crime area is not sufficient by itself to justify stopping an individual on 
the theory that most people in that area are engaged in criminal 
activity.90 Courts do not want to punish individuals for where they live, or 
for the demographic groups to which they belong.91 However, presence 
in a high-crime area can be considered as a relevant factor in 
determining whether the police have reasonable suspicion, a lower 
hurdle than probable cause,92 to briefly detain someone.93 
It is in such situations that courts consider group statistics on 
criminality within an area. Although one article has noted that most 
courts are content to rely on “an officer’s testimony that an area is a 
‘high-crime area’ without much analysis as to the basis of that 
 
own control.”); see also William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137, 
2164 (2002) (“Current Fourth Amendment law discourages group seizures. . . . Aggre-
gate justifications—[where] no one person is reasonably suspected, but the odds are 
high that some members of the group are criminals—do not suffice.”). 
88 See Bacigal, supra note 20, at 295–97; see also David A. Harris, Using Race or 
Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Descrip-
tion, Yes; Prediction, No, 73 Miss. L.J. 423, 451 (2003) (“Group guilt can be both im-
mensely powerful and deeply troubling when used to punish people or focus suspi-
cion on them merely for their associations.”). 
89  E.g., United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129–30, 1138 
(9th Cir. 2000); see Raymond, supra note 59, at 105–06 (discussing a hypothetical 
where one in three individuals in a certain area is likely to possess drugs and arguing 
that, although this probability likely satisfies reasonable suspicion, “reasonable suspi-
cion would not exist as to each individual in the neighborhood”). According to Ray-
mond, “[s]ome particularized observations—proof that implicates an identified indi-
vidual—must also be offered in support of the claim of reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 
106 (footnote omitted). 
90  Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (“The fact that appellant was in a 
neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding 
that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct.”). 
91 See generally Raymond, supra note 59. 
92 See supra Part II.B. 
93 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“[O]fficers are not re-
quired to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the 
circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.”). 
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conclusion,”94 some courts have required prosecutors to provide 
quantitative evidence demonstrating the existence of a high-crime area.95 
Courts must then review statistical evidence on whether a particular 
location is either a high-crime area or undergoing a crime wave with 
respect to the criminal activity at issue.96 
Courts have also examined group statistics when assessing the 
efficacy of random searches and seizures that do not require a showing of 
probable cause, to determine whether these intrusions are reasonable. 
Sobriety roadblocks, airport screening programs, and the practice of 
ordering motorists to exit their vehicle during traffic stops have all been 
assessed using percentages of criminal activity found per search or 
seizure.97 In Delaware v. Prouse,98 the Supreme Court invalidated random 
stops made by the Delaware Highway Patrol in part because “no empirical 
evidence indicated that such stops would be an effective means of 
promoting roadway safety.”99 Later, distinguishing Prouse, the Supreme 
Court upheld a sobriety checkpoint pilot program where “the detention 
of [each of] the 126 vehicles that entered the checkpoint resulted in the 
arrest of two drunken drivers. Stated as a percentage, approximately 1.6 
percent of the drivers passing through the checkpoint were arrested for 
alcohol impairment.”100 
It is important to note that statistics that measure the likelihood of 
criminality within a certain group, like the ones mentioned above, are 
usually insufficient to satisfy probable cause, which is a much higher bar 
than reasonable suspicion. Satisfying probable cause almost always 
requires some individualized suspicion.101 As one court of appeals held, 
 
94 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” 
Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable 
Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1607 (2008). 
95 E.g., United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding 
not “clearly erroneous” the district court’s determination that a location could not be 
categorized as a high-crime area where “an average of 1.3 arrests [were made] per 
week [near the place of the stop], and that most of the arrests were for misdemeanors 
and summary offenses” due to the large number of people who frequent the area); 
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1139 n.32 (9th Cir. 2000) (requir-
ing district courts to “examine with care the specific data underlying any such asser-
tion” of the existence of a high-crime area). For a detailed analysis of how courts have 
attempted to standardize quantification of statistics relevant to the existence of a 
high-crime area, see Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 94, at 1607–23. 
96 See United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2007) (articulat-
ing the test for determining if a neighborhood’s crime profile can contribute to rea-
sonable suspicion). 
97 Bacigal, supra note 20, at 311–14. 
98 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
99 Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990) (distinguish-
ing Prouse). 
100 Id. at 454–55. The Court also relied on data from other states that “on the 
whole, sobriety checkpoints resulted in drunken driving arrests of around 1 percent of 
all motorists stopped.” Id. at 455. 
101 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997). 
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“[s]tanding alone, a high incidence of child molestation by persons 
convicted of child pornography crimes may not demonstrate that a child 
molester is likely to possess child pornography.”102 
2. Error Rates and Individualized Suspicion 
When probable cause is the requisite standard, courts often assess 
statistical evidence to indicate a likelihood of criminality particular to an 
individual suspect. Devices such as drug sniffing dogs and fingerprint 
analysis are used by police to generate suspicion specific to an individual. 
Instead of using statistics to determine how likely it is that individuals in a 
group are criminals, statistical evidence here quantifies the error rates of 
investigative tools that indicate whether a particular individual is behaving 
criminally. The quantification of error rates for such devices, therefore, 
does not ascribe guilt to any class of individuals or otherwise violate the 
notion that probable cause must be based on individualized suspicion. 
For example, quantitative data has been used to assess the reliability 
of tipsters in providing the police with accurate information about 
criminal activity, based on how many tips lead to the discovery of criminal 
activity.103 In fact, some courts have held that “[w]hen an informant has a 
proven track record for providing reliable information, corroboration of 
the information he provides is not necessarily essential.”104 However, 
courts have not quantified in a standardized way what constitutes a 
reliable track record, likely because the nature of the information 
matters more than the bare percentage of times an informant has given 
accurate information.105 
Statistical data is also used to bolster the demonstration of probable 
cause in cases where a binary search leads to a full search.106 This is a 
particularly salient issue in the context of drug sniffing dogs, who are 
constitutionally permitted to sniff the outside of an individual’s vehicle or 
suitcase in a public place without any suspicion.107 Courts must then 
determine if a drug sniffing dog’s positive alert provided the police with 
 
102 United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
United States v. Adkins, 169 F. App’x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). As another example, courts have held that merely finding drugs in a 
defendant’s car does not lead to probable cause that he has drugs in his house. E.g., 
State v. Kahn, 555 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). 
103 E.g., United States v. Shepherd, 714 F.2d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(“[O]n approximately thirty earlier occasions the informant had provided infor-
mation that had led to over twenty-five convictions.”). 
104 United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). 
105 See United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The bar 
for establishing an informant’s veracity through references to his track record is not 
high. For example, courts have uniformly held that an informant’s veracity is ade-
quately established when the affiant asserts that the informant has supplied infor-
mation leading to arrests and convictions.”). 
106 See supra Part II.A. 
107 Id. 
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probable cause to search an area. Prior to Florida v. Harris,108 as one 
scholar noted, the Supreme Court had “not yet addressed the specific 
qualifications that a ‘trained canine’ possesses . . . [or] questioned the 
accuracy record of a particular canine in practice. As a result, lower 
courts have attempted to fill the gap and determine when a canine alert 
may be accepted as reliable.”109 
In a decision that was recently reversed in Harris, the Florida 
Supreme Court held that “field performance records” and evidence 
regarding the dog handler’s training must be considered when a judge 
assesses whether a dog’s positive alert provided probable cause.110 Many 
courts across the country have also examined a drug sniffing dog’s 
“accuracy rate”111 in determining whether the dog’s positive alert satisfied 
the probable cause standard.112 However, some courts have held that 
accuracy rates are not essential to the probable cause determination.113 
Police in those jurisdictions may simply demonstrate that the dog that 
 
108 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013). 
109 Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcot-
ics Detection Dog, 85 Ky. L.J. 405, 417 (1996–1997). 
110 Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 775 (Fla. 2011), overruled by Harris, 133 
S. Ct. 1050 (2013). 
111 Accuracy rates are usually measured by dividing the number of times 
drugs were found after a particular dog alerted to their presence by the number of 
times that dog alerted to the presence of drugs. For a full analysis on how error rates 
should be measured and the issues that arise when compiling statistics in the context 
of drug sniffing dogs, see infra Part III.B. 
112 E.g., United States v. Anderson, 367 F. App’x 30, 33 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that a canine alert was sufficient to establish probable cause where, “[e]ven 
assuming [defendant]’s view of the statistics, Aron [the dog] had a 55% accuracy rate 
in finding measurable amounts of drugs”); United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 
1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that “a 70–80% success rate [by the drug detection 
dog Bobo] meets the liberal standard for probable cause established in Gates”); Unit-
ed States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The affidavit states 
that [the dog] Pogo is certified, was trained to alert to drug odors . . . and had alerted 
approximately 65 times to controlled substances and contraband in four-and-one-half 
years on the job. Drugs were not found five of those times—for an overall reliability 
rate of 92 percent.”); United States v. Huerta, 247 F. Supp. 2d 902, 910 (S.D. Ohio 
2002) (holding that the court was “unwilling to conclude that [the dog] Abby’s alert 
on the van, alone, established probable cause to search that vehicle” when Abby had 
an approximately 65% success rate); Commonwealth v. Ramos, 894 N.E.2d 611, 613–
14 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that probable cause was not satisfied where, in the 
past four-and-a-half years, the dog had only five to six correct alerts and two false 
alerts). 
113 See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394–96 (6th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that evidence of training and certification was sufficient but evidence of the dog’s 
performance was admissible on the issue of “credibility” of the dog); United States v. 
Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1007 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that an affidavit describing 
Chane as a “trained, certified marijuana sniffing dog” was sufficient to give police 
probable cause to obtain a warrant to search “defendant’s locker in the Poco Storage 
Company”). 
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made the positive alert is well trained and certified,114 and sometimes do 
not even need to show that.115 
In Harris, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a “checklist” of 
evidence, including field accuracy rates, was necessary to establish 
probable cause.116 A unanimous Court concluded that lower courts may 
consider the totality of the evidence presented in favor of a dog’s 
reliability, and should particularly rely on a dog’s certification with a 
legitimate training company.117 The Court’s conclusion was partially 
based on the fact that certification organizations require dogs to be 
tested in controlled, simulated environments. As discussed in Part IV.B, 
this reliance on controlled testing over recordkeeping of field accuracy 
rates relies on the mistaken assumption that data on false positive rates is 
particularly helpful in answering the probable cause inquiry. 
Whether by trusting false positive data or when conducting a more 
rigorous scrutiny of other binary devices, courts increasingly recognize 
the need to rely on quantifiable evidence relevant to individualized 
suspicion when conducting a probable cause inquiry. The Supreme 
Court’s resistance to quantifying probable cause, however, has resulted in 
assessments of probabilistic evidence that are non-uniform and 
haphazard. Questions concerning which evidence should be quantified, 
how to best quantify that evidence, and how to interpret the statistics, 
remain largely unresolved. Resolution of these questions is essential to 
bringing uniformity to the probable cause inquiry and protecting against 
unreasonable searches.118 
III. Quantifying Evidence Relevant to Probable Cause 
The vices of a vague probable cause standard, including the lack of 
clarity and susceptibility to abuse mentioned above, are not outweighed 
by its virtues when law enforcement replaces investigative techniques that 
harness a police officer’s expertise or judgment with nonhuman tools or 
 
114 See Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the 
Protection of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 735, 761 (2007) 
(“Often, courts are willing to accept assertions of the dog’s training and certification 
as prima facie evidence of a dog’s accuracy.”); see also id. at 761 n.96 (citing United 
States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir. 1996); Venema, 563 F.2d at 1007; United 
States v. Stanley, 4 F. App’x 148, 150 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
115 See United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) 
(holding that “[t]he fact that the dog alerted provided probable cause to search” 
even in the absence of a showing of training and reliability). 
116 Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1056 (2013). 
117 Id. at 1056–57. 
118 Although the Supreme Court, in deciding Florida v. Harris, missed an 
opportunity to properly ensure that a drug sniffing dog’s alert is sufficiently reliable 
to establish probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, state legislatures can cre-
ate laws that require more evidence of reliability, or more record-keeping of a dog’s 
field accuracy rate. 
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forensic methods.119 Despite their perceived precision, investigative 
techniques that rely on forensic analysis or mechanized devices are 
fallible.120 Indeed, techniques such as drug sniffing dogs, fingerprint 
analysis,121 facial recognition technology,122 DNA matching,123 and child-
pornography-detecting software124 have variable rates of error, depending 
on the quality of the tool being used and the skill of the human 
operator.125 There is a growing literature on the unreliability of positive 
 
119 Police are increasingly investing in binary search technology, described 
supra Part II.A, because in many cases, no suspicion is required to conduct a binary 
search. Michael Bell, Note, Caballes, Place, and Economic Rin-tin-tincentives: The Effect of 
Canine Sniff Jurisprudence on the Demand for and Development of Search Technology, 72 
Brook. L. Rev. 279, 284–88 (2006) (discussing “law enforcement agencies’ market 
demand for technologies—such as thermal imaging devices, x-ray scanners, stationary 
radar detectors, and drug sniffing canines—that enhance police officers’ abilities to 
detect unlawful activity, make arrests, or issue citations” (footnotes omitted)). 
120 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., 
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print 
Analysis, Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Prac-
tice Through a Systems Approach (2012), available at http://www.nist.gov/ 
customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=910745 (studying errors in fingerprint analysis); An-
drew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 
Hastings L.J. 15, 20–25, 52–59 (1990) (discussing problems with dog scent lineups, 
where a dog smells evidence at a crime scene and is then used to detect an identical 
smell on a suspect); Natalie Ram, The Mismatch Between Probable Cause and Partial 
Matching, 118 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 182, 185 (2009), http://thepocketpart.org/2009/ 
04/13/ram.html (describing how “partial [DNA] matching methods presently have a 
substantial rate of false positives—supposed relatives who, upon analysis, turn out not 
to be related”). Justice Souter largely based his dissent in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405 (2005), which held that dogs may sniff vehicles during routine traffic stops, on 
the fact that “[t]he infallible dog . . . is a creature of legal fiction.” Id. at 411. 
121 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 120, at 32 (discussing research that 
shows that error rates in fingerprint matching “may not be trivial” (quoting Simon A. 
Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. Crim. 
L. & Tech. 985, 1034 (2005))). 
122  The New York City Police Department has invested in facial recognition 
technology that would, according to one court, “use thousands of government and 
private cameras to capture vehicle license plates, suspicious behavior and the faces of 
pedestrians using facial recognition technology, all of which would be fed into a cen-
tral database maintained at an NYPD command center where the information would 
be immediately analyzed to determine whether any security threat was imminent or 
whether there was any suspicious pattern in the movement of persons and vehicles.” 
N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 2009, at 18 (N.Y. 
June 26, 2009). 
123 Familial DNA matching occurs when a DNA sample from a crime scene 
partially matches the DNA stored in a DNA databank. This type of partial match does 
not implicate the person whose DNA is stored, but relatives of that person. See Ram, 
supra note 120, at 183. 
124 See Simmons, supra note 14, at 453 (describing hypothetical software that 
sifts through millions of emails and files to uncover child pornography, boasting a 
low false positive rate, but a similarly low accuracy rate). 
125 Fingerprint analysis, presumed highly reliable by courts, is subject to a 
variety of human errors. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 120, at 23 (discussing 
human-factor errors “that are specific to an individual examiner, those that are fea-
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alerts by drug sniffing dogs due to handlers misreading the dog’s signals 
or influencing the dog’s behavior.126 
Despite the potential for false positives, courts have held that positive 
results from some of these techniques, including drug sniffing dogs, can 
satisfy probable cause without any other basis for suspicion.127 Other 
scholars believe that positive results from certain techniques should 
never be enough on their own to satisfy probable cause.128 Rather than 
presume that certain types of investigative devices are always reliable 
enough or never reliable enough to satisfy probable cause, courts should 
hold that alerts from these devices may or may not be sufficient to yield 
probable cause. Consideration of the error rates of certain investigative 
tools should be deemed necessary to determine whether positive alerts by 
such tools are reliable enough to satisfy probable cause to conduct a full 
search.129 
Other investigative techniques, usually those relying on a police 
officer’s skill or experience, would not benefit as much from a rigorous 
quantification of error rates. Separating these two types of techniques is 
critical because data collection requires resources, and because an overly 
technical assessment of probable cause may distort the role that police 
expertise and intuition plays in the inquiry.130 It is also critical that error 
rates are measured in ways that can be most easily translated into the 
 
tures or products of the work environment, and those that are the result of failures of 
supervision and the structure of the organization”). Drug sniffing dogs also have 
highly variable error rates. As Justice Souter noted in Caballes, “a study cited by Illinois 
in this case for the proposition that dog sniffs are ‘generally reliable’ shows that dogs 
in artificial testing situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of 
the time, depending on the length of the search.” Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 412 (2005) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Kelly J. Garner et al., Duty Cycle of the Detector Dog: A 
Baseline Study 12 (Apr. 2001) (prepared by Auburn Univ. Inst. for Biological Detec-
tion Sys., funded by the Fed. Aviation Admin.)); see also Bird, supra note 109, at 411 
n.41.  
126 E.g., Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 114, at 762 (explaining that the 
handlers of drug detection dogs can “cause an error by influencing a dog’s sniff or 
misconstruing a dog’s reaction”); Lisa Lit et al., Handler Beliefs Affect Scent Detection Dog 
Outcomes, Animal Cognition (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.npca.net/Files/SWGDOG/ 
LIT%20Study.pdf (demonstrating that a dog is more likely to positively alert to drugs 
where handlers believe drugs are located). A lawsuit was recently filed alleging that 
the Nevada Highway Patrol was training its dogs to respond to cues instead of the 
smell of drugs. See Nicole Lucht, NHP Troopers Sue Department Over K-9 Program, 8 
News NOW (June 26, 2012), http://www.8newsnow.com/story/18886948/ 
nhp-troopers-sue-department-over-k-9-program. 
127 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
128 One scholar has argued that a positive alert by a drug sniffing dog, on its 
own, should never satisfy probable cause. See infra note 164 and accompanying text. 
129 Some of these techniques are intrusive enough to already be considered 
searches, requiring probable cause or reasonable suspicion before they can be used. 
Binary searches may even trigger Fourth Amendment protections if they intrude up-
on privacy interests. See Simmons, supra note 14, at 459–62. 
130 See infra Part IV for arguments against quantifying probable cause generally. 
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probable cause inquiry, and that judges are aware of the limitations of 
quantification. 
A. Requiring Error Rates 
Rather than presume that positive results from mechanized or 
nonhuman investigative techniques are always (or never) sufficient to 
satisfy probable cause, quantified error rates should be included in the 
probable cause inquiry. This section proposes some guidelines for courts 
to determine when to require quantified error rates and when a rigorous 
assessment of error rates is unnecessary. 
1. Cases Where Quantified Error Rates Are Not Necessary 
As one scholar has remarked, “[a]ll proof is ultimately ‘probabilistic’ 
in the sense that no conclusion can ever be drawn from empirical data 
without some step of inductive inference. The question is whether to 
bring this probabilistic element of inference to explicit attention in a 
quantified way, i.e., in overtly probabilistic evidence.”131 Some of the 
evidence relevant to probable cause can best be assessed without overtly 
probabilistic attention, using testimony that need not be reduced to 
numbers. For example, a police officer’s testimony that a driver had a 
large air freshener hanging from his rearview mirror satisfied probable 
cause to stop the car for violating a statute prohibiting mirror 
obstructions.132 Probable cause was also satisfied when a police officer 
searched a duffel bag belonging to a man arrested for burglary after the 
police officer recognized the bag from the bank robbery.133 
Statistical evidence could have been used in these cases, as in every 
case, to assess the reliability of a police officer’s suspicion. Courts could 
require data on how often a police officer actually recovers evidence 
from her searches or, in the case of arrests, how often a targeted 
individual has actually committed the crime suspected by police. 
However, in situations where the police can testify to their direct 
observations, statistical evidence is not necessary to assess reliability. In 
these cases, statistical evidence measures only how effectively and how 
scrupulously officers are performing their jobs, and police officers can 
testify directly. 
For example, the collection of data on a particular informant’s 
accuracy rate (or “track record”) in leading the police to criminal activity 
can assist the courts in determining if a particular informant is likely to 
be lying or misinformed in a particular case. However, discerning the 
accuracy of an informant is something law enforcement learns to do over 
time when dealing with informants. In some situations, a police officer 
may have reason to believe that an informant who has been unreliable in 
 
131 Bacigal, supra note 20, at 295. 
132 United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d 608, 612–16 (7th Cir. 2011). 
133 United States v. Potts, 459 F. App’x 455, 456 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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the past is now highly credible. A police officer’s expert intuition might 
actually be more accurate in that case than any past statistical evidence of 
the informant’s track record.134 In the case of informants, police can 
perform the same task as statistical evidence in determining reliability, 
and in fact can sometimes perform the task better. Thus, while data on 
an informant’s track record is relevant to probable cause, it should not 
be required.135 
As another example, one scholar has proposed that success rates in 
recovering evidence be reported for individual police officers (not just for 
their informants) as part of the probable cause determination.136 This data 
would be helpful in ferreting out officers who lie to obtain warrants or who 
frequently misjudge informants,137 but should not be deemed necessary to 
the probable cause analysis. If officers seeking to establish probable cause 
had to present evidence of their own track records, this might over-deter 
them from following their instincts in close cases for fear of being accused 
of malfeasance. Moreover, in cases where police are making judgment calls 
in unique or fast-developing situations, the factors influencing probable 
cause are less susceptible to statistical quantification.138 
2. Cases Where Quantified Error Rates Are Necessary 
In contrast, where a police officer uses a device or investigative 
technique to perform a task that she cannot perform based on her 
observation, intuition, or judgment, statistical evidence would not 
measure how well the police are performing their jobs or whether they 
are lying to magistrate judges, but would evaluate the accuracy of a device 
that has essentially replaced the police officer. In addition, because the 
tools being measured largely do not rely on a police officer’s expertise in 
appraising criminal behavior, and operate somewhat independently of 
the police officer, the officer cannot accurately assess that tool’s 
reliability based on observation or skill. Error rates should be required, 
for instance, where the police use drug sniffing dogs outside vehicles at 
routine traffic stops because the police cannot tell from direct 
observation in that one instance the accuracy of a particular dog.139 
 
134 For more on how courts have used informants’ track records, see supra 
Part II.C. 
135 The Supreme Court’s determination that the reliability of a drug sniff-
ing dog can be assessed in the same way as a confidential informant thus ignores the 
ability of humans to judge each other’s credibility in a way that cannot be accom-
plished when assessing a dog’s reliability. See Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1056 
(2013). 
136 Minzner, supra note 78, at 920–21. 
137 See id. at 922; see generally Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Po-
lice Lies, 47 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (2010). 
138 See Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Whether 
or not probable cause exists is not susceptible to statistical quantification. It 
represents a judgment call on the part of the officer or officers at the scene taking 
into account the particular circumstances.”). 
139 The Florida Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion. See supra Part 
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Consider a case in which a witness tells a police officer that someone 
discarded a gun behind a dumpster after being involved in a murder. 
Police recover the gun, and a fingerprint analyst finds that a print left on 
the gun matches a suspect. The testimony of the police officer and 
witness (with cross-examination if a court is later reviewing probable 
cause at a criminal trial) speaks directly to whether the suspect touched 
the gun. No statistics are needed to establish the police officer’s 
reliability. Statistical evidence on the print examiner’s accuracy rate, 
however, is needed to assess whether his determination that the prints 
matched was reliable. The police cannot assess this themselves. The same 
would be true for DNA matches and positive alerts by drug sniffing dogs 
or facial recognition technology. 
A more difficult case involves a police officer’s testimony that a 
suspect was located in a “high-crime area.” As mentioned above, presence 
in a high-crime area cannot establish probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion on its own, but may be relevant to the inquiry.140 Suspicion 
based on presence in a “high-crime area” exists on the border between 
evidence whose reliability can be established with direct testimony and 
evidence that requires statistical verification. Unlike the case of an 
informant, where a police officer can provide testimony on why he 
trusted a particular informant in a particular situation, it is far more 
difficult for courts to assess whether, in general, an area has certain crime 
characteristics. Courts might consider, as some scholars have proposed, 
requiring statistical evidence to demonstrate that a particular location is a 
high-crime area.141 However, because police officers learn from 
experience which neighborhoods have particular profiles for criminality, 
police officers’ testimony about a neighborhood being a high-crime area 
is more well-informed and instinctively based than testimony that a 
particular investigative device is accurate. Because evidence that an area 
is high in criminal activity cannot on its own satisfy probable cause, courts 
could simply decide that rigorous statistical evidence is less important in 
this context. 
B. Calculating Error Rates 
Once a court determines that a particular investigative technique 
requires statistical evidence to assess its reliability, the statistics must be 
properly calculated. False positive rates, which measure how often a 
device positively alerts given an innocent situation, can assess a device’s 
 
II.C. Most courts, however, presume that a drug sniffing dog’s positive alert is reliable 
if that dog has been trained and certified, and some even refuse to hear challenges to 
a dog’s training. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. in 
Support of Petitioner at 4, Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (No. 11-817) (cit-
ing cases that support the proposition). 
140 See supra Part II.D. 
141 See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 94, at 1593. 
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consistent, unchanging reliability.142 However, false positive rates are not 
directly translatable into the probable cause inquiry because they do not 
account for how often a device actually detects true criminal activity. This 
number will vary based on the population that is targeted by an 
investigative device. The question most appropriate to the probable cause 
inquiry is: What percentage of positive alerts by a particular investigative 
device, either alone or when combined with other evidence, actually lead 
to the discovery of criminal behavior? 
As explained in this subsection, in order to best assist a judge in 
making a probable cause determination, statistical evidence must 
account for both a device’s accuracy and the odds of criminality prior to 
using the device. These prior odds of criminality represent both the 
frequency of criminal activity among those targeted for the device’s use 
(often referred to as a “base rate”)143 and any extra suspicion a particular 
suspect has elicited prior to use of the device. A positive alert and a 
device’s false positive rate then “updates”144 these prior odds of 
criminality. The prior odds and the consistent device accuracy combine 
to answer the probable cause question—or, the odds that criminal 
behavior is occurring. 
1. False Positive Rates 
To ensure that a device is accurate enough to be probative of the 
probable cause inquiry, courts first need to know how an investigative 
tool’s positive alert affects the prior probability that a suspect is behaving 
criminally.145 A device with a high false positive rate provides information 
that is not particularly probative in affecting the probable cause inquiry, 
and does not greatly influence the prior likelihood of criminality. If a 
device is infallible, then every time it indicates criminal activity, courts 
can be sure there is a 100% chance that criminal activity is occurring. In 
measuring the accuracy of a fallible device, courts should be concerned 
with “false positives,” or incorrect indications of criminal behavior.146 
 
142 Simmons, supra note 14, at 452–53. 
143 Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Ver-
dict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 Cornell L. 
Rev. 247, 247 n.2 (1990) (“Base rates describe the frequency with which a relevant 
attribute occurs among members of a reference population. A base rate may also be 
thought of as the probability that a randomly selected member of a reference popula-
tion will have the relevant attribute.”). 
144 For a thorough discussion of how prior odds of criminal behavior can be 
updated with new information using a formula called Bayes’ Theorem, see generally id. 
at 255–56. 
145 The probative value of a piece of evidence is defined by the degree to 
which it “tends to prove or disprove a point an issue.” Black’s Law Dictionary 639 
(9th ed. 2009) (definition of “probative evidence”); see also id. at 1323 (“probative” 
defined as “[t]ending to prove or disprove”). 
146 In the surveillance context, for example, false positives are defined as 
“interceptions that prove upon investigation to have no intelligence value.” Richard 
A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 245, 252 (2008). False pos-
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False positives are particularly troubling in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment, as they lead to intrusive searches of innocent individuals.147 
False positive rates can be measured by testing a device in simulated 
situations where the device should not positively alert. For example, if 
facial recognition technology is exposed to 100 faces that do not actually 
match a suspect’s face, and the technology indicates a match for 50 of 
those faces, the technology has a 50% false positive rate. If Bandit the 
cocaine-sniffing dog, in a training test, is exposed to 1000 cars that do not 
contain cocaine, and Bandit alerts to the presence of drugs in two of 
those cars, Bandit has a fairly low false positive rate of 0.2%. Bandit’s 
accuracy means that his positive alert is highly probative in determining 
the likelihood that a car contains cocaine, if he also has a good 
specificity, meaning if he has a high “true positive” percentage of alerting 
when there are actually drugs in the car. 
The probative value of a device in demonstrating probable cause can 
be measured using the ratio of the true positive to the false positive rate, 
or what some scholars have termed a “likelihood ratio.”148 The likelihood 
ratio measures the ratio of how often an alert would occur given that 
there are drugs in the car to how often an alert would occur given that 
there are no drugs in the car.149 A dog that always alerts when there are 
drugs in the car, but has a 50% false positive rate has a likelihood ratio of 
two, or 1/0.5. A likelihood ratio of two means that the odds of drugs 
being in a particular location are twice as likely, given an alert, than if 
there is no alert. 
False positive rates do not give a complete picture of probable cause, 
however. Even if a device has a very low rate of false positives, this does 
not always translate to a high likelihood of criminal activity, the essence 
of the probable cause inquiry.150 In other words, Bandit’s 0.2% false 
positive rate does not necessarily mean that there is now a 99.8% chance 
that a car that Bandit alerts to contains cocaine. If there is a low 
incidence of cocaine in vehicles targeted by Bandit, say one out of every 
10,000 vehicles, Bandit’s 0.2% false positive rate will not translate to a 
high likelihood of drugs in a vehicle given a positive alert. For every 
10,000 vehicles, Bandit will falsely alert to the presence of cocaine 20 
times (10,000 x .002), and he will correctly alert to the presence of drugs 
 
itives are called a Type I error in statistics. See Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) 
and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1461, 1492–93 and n.179 
(2010). 
147 See Myers, supra note 19, at 12–13. 
148 D. H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Misquantification of Probative Value, 
27 Law & Hum. Behav. 645, 648 (2003). 
149 See David H. Kaye, The Double Helix and the Law of Evidence 20–
22 (2010). 
150 See Myers, supra note 19, at 12–16; see also Simmons, supra note 14, at 452 
(explaining that although a false positive rate is constant, the actual likelihood of 
criminality “will vary widely depending on the actual frequency of the illegal activity 
that is being investigated”). 
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once, assuming he always alerts when drugs are present. Thus, given a 
positive alert by Bandit, there will be only a 1/21 chance, or about a 5% 
chance, that a particular vehicle alerted to by Bandit will contain drugs. 
This should not satisfy probable cause—a 5% likelihood of criminal 
activity can hardly be said to warrant a person of “‘reasonable caution in 
the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”151 In short, 
Bandit’s false positive rate means that his positive alert is very probative in 
a probable cause inquiry, and it highly alters the prior probability of 
criminality of 1/10,000. However, the low percentage of drugs in the 
population targeted by Bandit means that his positive alert likely does not 
cross the probable cause hurdle.152 
This example illustrates why statistical evidence that accounts solely 
for false positive rates does not actually measure the odds of criminal 
behavior.153 Professor Richard Myers has explained, in the context of 
drug sniffing dogs and probability theory, why the odds that a dog will 
alert when there are no drugs in a vehicle (the false positive rate) is not 
the same as the odds that there are no drugs in a vehicle given that a dog 
has alerted (the information needed to answer the probable cause 
question).154 Using an equation called Bayes’ Theorem, Myers explains 
that what is missing from the false positive rate to convert it into the odds 
of criminal behavior is the prior probability of criminal activity.155 This 
prior probability can reflect either the degree to which an officer already 
suspects an individual,156 or the frequency of the criminal behavior within 
a population targeted by a device.157 As with the Bandit example, the false 
positive rate of a device is said to update the original odds of criminality 
with new odds for a particular suspect who has been identified as 
engaging in criminal behavior by the device.158 
Because base rates are so variable, the Supreme Court in Florida v. 
Harris was unduly hasty in concluding that “evidence of a dog’s 
satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself 
provide sufficient reason to trust his alert.”159 These programs use 
simulated testing that does not account for the variability of base rates of 
 
151 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (quoting Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
152 See Myers, supra note 19, at 14 (“If the probability [of criminal activity] 
was low to begin with, even a really good test will still result in a relatively low [likeli-
hood of that criminal activity].”). Although we do not know what the probable cause 
hurdle is, it is likely greater than 5% suspicion. 
153 See id. at 12–16. For another example of why false positives cannot an-
swer that probable cause question, using software that searches for child pornogra-
phy, see Simmons, supra note 14, at 453. 
154 Myers, supra note 19, at 12–16. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 See Simmons, supra note 14, at 451–53. 
158 See Myers, supra note 19, at 12–16. 
159 Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013). 
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drugs within the population. As explained in the next subsection, the 
Court’s elevation of “a dog’s real false positives”160 over field accuracy 
rates misunderstands the statistics involved, and places the probative 
value of false positives over the actual probable cause inquiry: the 
likelihood that drugs will actually be present in a particular car given a 
positive alert. 
2. Accuracy Rates 
To properly measure the actual likelihood of criminal behavior 
based on a positive alert by an investigative tool, statistical evidence must 
therefore account for both the tool’s accuracy (the false positive rate and 
the true positive rate) and either the frequency of criminality of those 
targeted for a device’s use, or some measure of a police officer’s 
suspicion prior to the positive alert (the prior odds of criminality).161 The 
frequency of criminal behavior in a population is difficult to measure, 
and it is basically impossible to quantify many of the intangible factors 
tending towards suspicion.162 Because even a low false positive rate is not 
a good indicator of likelihood of criminal activity, especially with largely 
innocent populations or where the police have no other reason to 
suspect someone of wrongdoing,163 Professor Myers argues that a positive 
alert by a drug sniffing dog should never be sufficient on its own, without 
knowing the prior odds of criminality, to satisfy probable cause.164 
However, there is a way to collect data that accounts for both a tool’s 
accuracy and the prior odds of criminality within the population targeted 
for use by a device. Police officers could record statistics in the field 
instead of measuring false positives in simulations. Field statistics 
measure how often a device’s positive alert leads to finding criminal 
activity, the key number for the probable cause analysis. Many courts 
already use field statistics in the context of drug sniffing dogs,165 although 
law enforcement does not always appear to be calculating them 
correctly.166 To translate most directly into the probable cause inquiry, 
 
160 Id. 
161 In the area of drug detection dogs, according to one scholar, “[p]olice 
usually use drug detection canines only after a suspect or item is sufficiently suspi-
cious to warrant the use of a dog. Therefore, the relevant ‘population’ is not the gen-
eral populace, but a narrowed group that police have determined through their 
training and experience are more likely to possess narcotics than the general public.” 
Bird, supra note 109, at 429 (footnote omitted). 
162 For example, how does one quantify the added suspicion gained when a 
suspect appears nervous, especially given that whether or not a suspect appears nerv-
ous is a vague and fairly subjective assessment?  
163 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
164 Myers, supra note 19. 
165 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1014 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Of-
ficer Berg testified that Naton’s accuracy rating is 98 or 99 percent in training and 85 
percent in the field.”). For more examples, see supra note 112. 
166 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 448 F. App’x 936, 939 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(“Moreover, even considering [the dog] Dusty’s alleged 70% accuracy rate in the 
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courts must assess the number of times drugs were found in the car out 
of the times that the dog had positively alerted, not given all the times a 
dog had been used. 
As an example, if Lucy the drug sniffing dog positively alerts to the 
presence of drugs in 100 cars targeted for drug sniffs in New York City, 
and 90 of those cars actually contain drugs, Lucy has a 90% field accuracy 
rate. If those field statistics can be extrapolated generally, which is a 
difficult question that will be discussed in the next subsection,167 courts 
can then conclude that if Lucy alerts to the presence of drugs in a 
vehicle, there is a 90% chance that drugs will be found in that vehicle. 
This answers the probable cause question, as a 90% likelihood of 
criminality will certainly satisfy probable cause. While 10 out of 100 car 
searches guided by an alert will likely not contain drugs, probable cause 
does not require that no innocents are searched. In contrast with a 50% 
false positive rate, if Lucy positively alerts to the presence of drugs 100 
times, and 50 of those cars actually contain drugs, we might then also be 
able to say that there is a 50% chance that drugs are actually in the 
vehicle if Lucy alerts. Depending on the actual probable cause hurdle, 
probable cause may or may not be satisfied in that case. 
For many cases, field statistics can directly translate into the probable 
cause inquiry. Field statistics reflect the degree of suspicion associated 
with a suspect’s behavior and the likelihood of criminality prior to using 
a device because, if officers target only those who are more likely to be 
behaving criminally, field accuracy rates will increase dramatically.168 Of 
course, police officers will then be using their intuitive judgment to 
determine which suspects to target, but that intuition is then entirely 
 
field, a positive alert would be sufficient to establish a ‘fair probability’ that drugs 
would be found in the car.”). At the district court level, Dusty’s accuracy rate should 
have been 56% but was calculated as 30% because the court did not simply account 
for the times that drugs were found in the vehicle given a positive alert, but also add-
ed the times that Dusty did not alert at all. See United States v. Smith, No. 2:09-cr-59-
FtM-29SPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123516, *13–14 (M.D. Fla. 2009). According to the 
district court, “[The investigator] also testified to reviewing the records of the K-9 
used in this case specifically for the years 2008 and 2009. During that time period, 
Dusty, the K-9, was used to potentially detect narcotics a total of 89 times. Thirty-two 
(32) of those times there was no alert and 57 times Dusty actually alerted. No narcot-
ics or narcotics paraphernalia were found as a result of 25 of those alerts. . . . In calcu-
lating the percentages, [the investigator] testified that almost 30 percent of the time 
Dusty alerted, there were no drugs present.” Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). 
167 Extrapolation of field data to formulate a general likelihood is difficult 
because the base rate of criminality varies, so questions will arise as to how specifically 
statistics need to be collected and broken down with respect to different locations, 
types of suspects, etc. For example, do field statistics need to account for use of the 
device among middle-aged men in Central Park, or can youths in the Upper West 
Side generally be aggregated with that data? What about all people in Manhattan? 
This question will be confronted infra Part III.C. 
168 Thus, requiring officers to collect field statistics may render the officers 
less willing to use particular devices on subjects in a largely innocent population 
without any prior suspicion. 
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reflected in an increase or decrease in the device’s accuracy. The device 
thus both reflects and replaces the officer’s intuition. In the Lucy 
example, any prior suspicion a police officer has before using Lucy is 
essentially transferred into her nose in altering her accuracy rate. 
Moreover, once the device has essentially replaced the police officer’s 
intuition, only statistical evidence can attest to the device’s accuracy rate. 
Ultimately, it is the positive alert by the device, and not the police officer, 
that makes a prediction relevant to probable cause. 
Field statistics even account for human error in using a device, as 
decreased accuracy rates in the field will result if law enforcement is 
using a device incorrectly. In the case of drug sniffing dogs, a dog’s 
handler may unconsciously cue the dog to alert when the handler thinks 
a vehicle is likely to contain drugs.169 This interaction between dog and 
handler will be incorporated into the field accuracy rates. If an officer is 
incorrect most of the time, the accuracy rate will decrease. If the 
interaction between dog and handler makes it more likely that a positive 
alert will lead to the discovery of drugs, this will also be reflected in the 
accuracy rate. 
Field statistics thus incorporate the prior odds of criminal 
wrongdoing and the accuracy of an investigative tool, which translate to 
the probability of criminal activity. Taking field statistics has some costs, 
however, and it may be difficult to discern which field statistics can be 
extrapolated so as to be relevant to a particular probable cause inquiry. 
These issues will be addressed in the next subsection. 
C. Problems with Quantifying Error Rates 
An obvious difficulty in mandating that quantified error rates be 
included as part of the probable cause inquiry is the time and cost of 
collecting this data. Although federal, state, and local legislatures 
routinely require that law enforcement collect certain statistics,170 the 
collection of data on accuracy rates relevant to the probable cause 
inquiry would, necessarily, be an unfunded mandate—courts can require 
the collection of such statistics, but cannot allocate money to fund the 
effort. However, many law enforcement groups already collect statistics 
testing the accuracy of particular investigative devices in order to more 
effectively perform their jobs.171 In many ways, the collection of this data 
would redound to the benefit of the law enforcement community: 
skeptical judges can be satisfied when devices are accurate, and law 
 
169 See Myers, supra note 19, at 34. 
170 See, e.g., Jordan Blair Woods, Comment, Addressing Youth Bias Crime, 56 
UCLA L. Rev. 1899, 1902 (2009) (“Bias crime statistics legislation allocates resources 
to facilitate the collection of data on bias crimes.”). 
171 See, e.g., Myers, supra note 19, at 33 (explaining that the United States 
Army mandates the collection of drug sniffing dogs’ field accuracy rates and propos-
ing that, “[a]t the very least, the courts should mandate the collection of data on the 
use of the dogs and their accuracy rates in the field”). 
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enforcement can have more faith in its investigations. Requiring 
statistical evidence on a device’s accuracy rate may deter police officers 
from using devices in random, haphazard ways, which would otherwise 
result in more false alerts in largely innocent populations.172 
Of course, asking law enforcement, or forensic scientists,173 to collect 
statistical evidence on the accuracy of its investigative tools could be 
likened to letting the fox guard the henhouse. Random checks and 
supervisory oversight can prevent police officers from improperly 
reporting statistics, but unscrupulous police officers may fail to report 
searches that do not result in uncovering evidence of illegal activity. That 
said, police officers are asked to collect statistics in areas that impugn 
their integrity far more than recording the accuracy of their investigative 
devices.174 
Even if police scrupulously record statistics, whether a device has 
actually produced a false alert may be a complicated question. For 
example, law enforcement officers may argue that if a drug sniffing dog 
gives a positive alert, but no drugs are found, then the area recently 
contained drugs that were removed prior to the search.175 For the 
purposes of the probable cause inquiry, the best approach would be to 
assume an inaccurate alert in all cases where illegal activity is not 
ultimately found. Because there is usually no way to tell whether drugs 
have been removed or if they were never there in the first place, 
assuming that the dog has alerted falsely best measures the percentage of 
cases in which a positive alert actually leads to the detection of criminal 
behavior, the essence of the probable cause inquiry. The point of 
collecting accuracy rates is ultimately not to test the quality of the dog, 
but the meaning of an alert by the dog—an alert that means “there used 
to be cocaine here” is not enough for a search.176 
 
172 See Bird, supra note 109, at 430–33. 
173 The study and collection of data on accuracy rates for finger print exam-
iners is explored thoroughly in The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors 
in Latent Print Analysis. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 120. 
174 For example, the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) has en-
tered into agreements with several law enforcement agencies requiring “the collec-
tion and analysis of demographic data on police stops. USDOJ typically monitors 
agencies operating under these agreements for continuing statistical evidence of bi-
as.” Michael R. Smith, Depoliticizing Racial Profiling: Suggestions for the Limited Use and 
Management of Race in Police Decision-Making, 15 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 219, 221 
(2005). 
175 See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment § 2.2(f) n.239, at 450 (3d ed. 1996) (“It has been estimated that 
most of the cash in circulation (the estimates range from 70% to 97% of all bills) 
contains sufficient quantities of cocaine to alert a trained dog. Thus it sometimes 
happens in practice that a drug dog alert will lead to nothing but currency.” (citation 
omitted)). 
176 For this reason, the Supreme Court was incorrect to conclude, in Florida 
v. Harris, that because of residual odors, a positive alert that leads to no discovery of 
evidence does not undermine a dog’s reliability in the probable cause inquiry. 133 S. 
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Problems will also arise in deciding which field accuracy data should 
be considered in the probable cause determination. Courts must 
consider whether all field data collected with respect to a particular dog 
is relevant, or only field data that is specific to a dog/law enforcement 
handler pair. Field sobriety tests, as another example, show a wide 
variance in accuracy depending on the officer administering the test.177 
Thus, data should be recorded for each officer individually. 
Because both the baseline frequency of criminal behavior in a 
population and odds with respect to a particular suspect based on her 
behavior contribute to field accuracy rates, courts must decide whether 
data from different areas in the same city can be combined, and whether 
data from the use on someone who behaved suspiciously can be 
combined with data for a suspicionless use of the device.178 If the police 
always use a device when there is some reason to suspect an individual of 
criminal behavior, this will compensate for any differences in the 
frequency of criminality in different locations and produce a consistent 
accuracy rate. In that instance, data from different locations in the same 
city can be combined and extrapolated into the probable cause inquiry. 
Questions regarding the basis for accuracy rates may mire courts in 
battles over whether the statistical evidence offered can be directly 
translated into the probable cause inquiry. However, this has not been 
overly problematic for the jurisdictions that already include statistical 
evidence in the probable cause inquiry.179 Currently, as mentioned above, 
courts already use field accuracy statistics and extrapolate to the probable 
cause inquiry in the areas of informants’ track records, efficacy of 
checkpoints, and high-crime areas; they are just not doing so in a 
particularly informed or systematized way.180 
The concern over which evidence is relevant to the probable cause 
inquiry can be resolved by simply giving more specific evidence more 
weight. Professor Max Minzner proposed a similar solution in the context 
of arguing that police should be required to present their accuracy rates 
as part of the probable cause inquiry.181 According to Minzner, the way in 
which the evidence was gathered, and how specific it is, should influence 
how much weight the evidence merits in the probable cause inquiry.182 
 
Ct. 1050, 1056–57 & n.2 (2013). Probable cause considers the likelihood that evi-
dence will actually be found, not the likelihood that a suspect actually committed the 
crime involved. An alert that does not lead to the detection of evidence should there-
fore be considered a false alert, even if the dog is correctly responding to the former 
presence of drugs. 
177 See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539–40 (D. Md. 2002). 
178 This might be problematic because individuals whom the police have 
reason to suspect of wrongdoing may have higher prior odds of criminality, affecting 
the Bayesian updating of a device’s accuracy. 
179 See supra note 112. 
180 Supra Parts II.D and III.B. 
181 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
182 Minzner, supra note 78, at 955. How courts can incorporate quantifiable 
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For example, if evidence is collected pertaining to the field accuracy rate 
of a particular drug sniffing dog/handler pair in a specific area in 
Philadelphia, and the dog is generally used only when police suspect an 
individual for other reasons insufficient to satisfy probable cause on their 
own, that data is highly relevant to the likelihood that an individual in 
that neighborhood, when targeted based on the usual level of suspicion 
by that particular dog/handler pair, is carrying drugs. 
In other words, statistical evidence collected in a very specific way 
applies to a particular instance that matches the other nearly identical 
field data. In contrast, evidence that is supported only by a 
heterogeneous sample carries less weight and may not be directly 
extrapolated into the probable cause likelihood, but can still be 
considered. If an accuracy rate is not measured specifically enough, for 
example, a court could hold that the prosecution has not met its burden 
of proof to satisfy probable cause. Or, a court could conclude that, in 
showing that a particular dog has a 70% accuracy rate with less specific 
statistical evidence, that the evidence is sufficient to meet the 50% 
hurdle. 
Those who argue against overly quantified legal standards also 
present the “capacity objection,” which asserts that courts, not generally 
experts in mathematics, are not well equipped to assess statistical 
evidence.183 The capacity objection provides another reason why courts 
should require statistical evidence only when there is no other valid way 
to assess whether a positive alert by that device gave rise to probable 
cause. However, this objection has much more salience when juries, not 
judges, are examining probabilistic evidence.184 According to Minzner, 
“magistrate judges . . . are repeat players in the search process. If 
statistical learning is possible, the search process presents the ideal test 
case. Furthermore, there is little evidence that judges are better at 
making a probability calculation from nonstatistical evidence.”185 
Judges, repeat players, can be instructed as to the pitfalls of weighing 
explicitly probabilistic evidence. The evolution of the increasingly 
nuanced and scientifically accurate role of DNA evidence in criminal 
 
evidence into the probable cause inquiry will be discussed infra Part IV. 
183 One scholar has explained that “capacity-based objections are claims 
that legal decision makers simply cannot make good decisions based on statistical da-
ta because they are not trained in drawing inferences from empirical data and, in any 
event, good, relevant data is generally unavailable.” Minzner, supra note 78, at 951. 
For further discussion of this objection, see infra Part IV. 
184 See Colin Miller, Diamond Dogs, Take 2: Etan Patz, Florida v. Harris & Quan-
tifying Probable Cause, EvidenceProf Blog (Apr. 22, 2012), http:// 
lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2012/04/cadaver-dogs-are-back-in-the-news-
with-the-relevation-that-a-cadaver-sniffing-dogdetected-the-odor-of-human-remains-in- 
a-base.html (discussing the differences between judges’ and juries’ weighing of prob-
abilistic evidence). 
185 Minzner, supra note 78, at 954–55; see supra Part III.B. 
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trials demonstrates how this learning occurs.186 Although Daubert-type 
hearings, which ensure that scientific evidence satisfies the requirements 
for expert testimony at trial, would not be necessary at the probable 
cause stage,187 the role of judge as gatekeeper to admit only scientifically 
valid testimony at trial should allay fears about a judge’s ability to 
conduct a flexible inquiry that examines error rates and is probabilistic in 
nature.188 
In some cases, courts may decide they must use false positive data 
instead of field accuracy rates. Using data on false positives is an attractive 
option because false positive rates are more easily measured and do not 
change based on the frequency of criminality within a population. New 
devices or recently developed techniques may require consideration of 
false positives, as there will be insufficient field statistics to measure 
accuracy. Alternatively, courts could use statistics from other devices; they 
could presume, for instance, that a well-trained dog that received a 
similar type of training is generally a certain percentage accurate until 
the dog has a large enough number of alerts. 
False positive data, generated by simulations, would also have to 
substitute for field data in cases where police cannot ultimately verify 
whether a suspect was behaving criminally. This occurs in cases of 
fingerprint or DNA analysis, where a forensic scientist may find a match, 
but there is no way to ultimately know if the suspect is guilty. Testing can 
still be performed on individual fingerprint examiners using artificial 
experiments to measure an examiner’s false positive rate.189 However, as 
mentioned above, false positive data does not speak directly to the 
probable cause inquiry.190 
In cases where statistics truly cannot be collected because of extreme 
hardship, cost, or complexity of data collection, courts could mandate 
standardized training in using a device.191 One of the reasons that the 
 
186 See generally Kaye, supra note 149. 
187 As one federal circuit court remarked with respect to dog sniffs, “the 
dog’s alert . . . would serve not as actual evidence of drugs, but simply to establish 
probable cause to obtain a warrant to search for such substantive evidence.” United 
States v. Allen, 159 F.3d 832, 840 (4th Cir. 1998). 
188 The Supreme Court in Daubert listed several factors for judges to consid-
er before admitting expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The Court 
instructed judges that, “in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court or-
dinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error, and the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation.” Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (citations omitted). 
189 See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 120, at 33–38. 
190 See infra Part IV for incorporation of different types of error rates into 
the probable cause inquiry. 
191 Richard Myers has proposed this with respect to drug sniffing dogs. See 
Myers, supra note 19, at 34 (“If we are really interested in protecting the public’s 
Fourth Amendment interests, we need to set state and federal standards for training 
dogs, rather than leaving them to the private sector. The process of drafting stand-
ards will move that debate out of the courts, where they are enforced by the exclu-
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Florida Supreme Court required field evidence of drug sniffing dogs’ 
accuracy as part of the probable cause inquiry was because “[i]n the 
absence of a uniform standard [of training of drug sniffing dogs], the 
reliability of the dog cannot be established by demonstrating only that a 
canine is trained and certified.”192 Standardized training and uniform 
protocols have also been suggested for fingerprint examiners.193 
Civil liberties are compromised when law enforcement uses fallible 
devices that sanction intrusive searches with no indication of their 
reliability. Ultimately, it is better to quantify accuracy rates than simply 
presume that a particular device’s positive alert gives rise to probable 
cause. Especially with new technology on the horizon,194 courts should 
establish standards for measuring an investigative tool’s reliability. 
IV. Quantifiable Evidence and the Probable Cause Standard 
As mentioned earlier, some courts have already begun mandating 
admission of quantifiable error rates for specific investigative techniques. 
Although the Supreme Court has declared that field accuracy rates are 
not absolutely required by the Fourth Amendment in determining the 
reliability of drug sniffing dogs, many prosecutors will continue to admit 
this type of evidence, as they have done in the past.195 Further, the 
prosecution may wish to proffer this type of evidence as part of the 
totality of the circumstances in order to rebut evidence by the defendant 
that a particular alert is unreliable or a particular dog’s certification is 
insufficient to establish probable cause.196 Courts are already confronting 
explicitly probabilistic evidence in many forms. When evidence sufficient 
to satisfy probable cause is admitted in probabilistic terms, the reasons 
for not assigning a minimum probability of certainty necessary to satisfy 
probable cause are far less compelling. 
There have not been many proposals to quantify probable cause. 
According to Professor Craig Lerner, “[f]ew courts have summoned the 
courage, or foolhardiness, to propose . . . a number (e.g., thirty percent 
probability) for probable cause.”197 Lerner instead offered a 
 
sionary rule, and into police standards commissions and legislatures.”). 
192 Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 768 (Fla. 2011), overruled by Florida v. Har-
ris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013). 
193 See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 120, at 90, 164–67. 
194 See, e.g., Sam Kamin, Law and Technology: The Case for a Smart Gun Detector, 
59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 221, 221 (1996). 
195 See supra Part I. 
196 In Florida v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may coun-
ter the prosecution’s evidence that a dog is well trained “by disputing the reliability of 
the dog overall or of a particular alert.” 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1058 (2013). This may lead 
particular states to require record keeping on field accuracy rates anyway, as these 
accuracy rates are certainly relevant to any totality of the circumstances inquiry. 
197 Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 951, 
995 (2003). 
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mathematical formula to evaluate whether there is sufficient probable 
cause based on the probability of a successful search and its social value 
against a search’s social cost, or privacy intrusion.198 Another scholar, 
Ronald Bacigal, came closer to quantifying probable cause, by assigning 
probable cause a range of approximately 40–49%,199 but stopped short of 
“endorsing precise mathematical expressions of probable cause.”200 
Bacigal, wishing to add some clarity to the probable cause inquiry, still 
cautions that “[t]oo much precision diminishes the resources of 
ambiguity.”201 
There are situations, however, where the utility of ambiguity is 
outweighed by the benefits of clarifying the standard, especially in light 
of recent developments that have greatly diminished review of probable 
cause decisions.202 Quantifying probable cause would add both integrity 
and accountability to the jurisprudence, allowing citizens to evaluate 
courts’ decisions and reducing cynicism over application of the fuzzy, 
“malleable probable cause analysis.”203 Quantifying probable cause can 
also provide police with a more certain standard to guide their decisions 
in the field. 
This final section examines how assigning a minimum numerical 
value to the probable cause hurdle would function in a variety of 
scenarios, and explores how courts should choose the numerical value. 
In so doing, this section rebuts the myriad objections by courts and 
scholars to quantifying probable cause. 
A. Quantifying Probable Cause 
Quantifying probable cause presents varying benefits and drawbacks, 
depending on the types of evidence used to satisfy probable cause. There 
are three basic scenarios in which judges would confront a numerical 
probable cause standard. In cases where a positive alert from a 
mechanized device is the critical factor in producing probable cause, 
many of the objections to assigning probable cause a value disappear. 
The quantifiable evidence can be used directly to determine whether the 
probable cause standard is satisfied. In cases where both quantitative and 
 
198 Id. at 1019–21. Lerner’s formula looks like this: P × V > (1 – P) × (C × 
m), where P is the probability a search will be successful, V is the value of the search, 
C is the cost of the search, and m is the privacy multiplier for particularly stigmatizing 
searches. Id. at 1020–21. 
199 Bacigal, supra note 20, at 338–39. 
200 Id. at 339. 
201 Id. Bacigal also argued that the requisite degree of suspicion should de-
pend somewhat on the severity of the crime and the exigencies of the circumstances. 
See id. at 323–32. These views will be addressed infra Part IV.B. 
202 See supra Part II.B. 
203 See John M. Burkoff, The Fourth Amendment and Terrorism, 109 Penn St. L. 
Rev. 911, 920–21 (2005) (describing the “‘fluid’ and open-ended conception of prob-
able cause” articulated in Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370–72 (2003)). 
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qualitative evidence are necessary to satisfy probable cause, judges cannot 
rely solely on the number produced by the quantifiable evidence and 
compare it to the probable cause number. However, judges can use the 
value associated with probable cause to discern how close the 
quantifiable evidence comes to satisfying probable cause and can then 
assess whether the qualitative evidence, combined with the quantitative 
evidence, crosses the probable cause threshold. In cases where only 
qualitative evidence is considered, assigning probable cause a numerical 
percentage is valuable only to the extent that it provides a conceptual 
benchmark, but judges should not attempt to actually quantify the 
inquiry. 
1. Cases Where Quantifiable Evidence Is the Critical Factor in Satisfying 
Probable Cause 
In situations where quantifiable evidence is the sole or critical factor 
creating probable cause, the benefits of added clarity in the law outweigh 
the downsides of quantifying probable cause. Consider a common 
scenario. The police pull over a vehicle and briefly detain an individual 
for reasons unrelated to drug possession, such as making an improper 
lane change,204 or having an improperly illuminated license plate.205 
While detained, the individual behaves suspiciously, perhaps appearing 
nervous when answering questions,206 but the behavior is not sufficiently 
suspicious to give the police probable cause to search the vehicle for 
evidence of illegal activity.207 However, the suspicion suffices to permit the 
police to continue detaining the individual to wait for a drug sniffing dog 
to arrive and sniff the exterior of the vehicle.208 The dog positively alerts 
to the presence of drugs inside the vehicle, giving the police probable 
cause to search the vehicle, and drugs are ultimately found.209 A court 
upholds the search, largely based on the dog’s alert.210 The court will cite 
language such as “[a] positive identification by a dog during a canine 
search following a lawful stop of a vehicle provides probable cause that 
drugs are present in the vehicle, thereby justifying a search of the 
vehicle.”211 
 
204 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 334 Fed. App’x. 880, 881 (10th 
Cir. 2009). 
205 See, e.g., United States v. Mohamed, 600 F.3d 1000, 1002 (8th Cir. 2010). 
206 Id. 
207 See id. (“Trooper Frisby told Mohamed that he had reasonable suspicion 
to run a drug dog around the car.”). 
208 See Lopez-Gutierrez, 334 Fed. App’x. at 883 (“A traffic stop may be extend-
ed if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”). 
209 See Mohamed, 600 F.3d at 1002–03. 
210 See Lopez-Gutieriez, 334 Fed. App’x. at 883 (“An alert by a certified drug-
sniffing dog during a sweep of the exterior of the vehicle can give probable cause to 
search the interior.”). 
211 Mohamed, 600 F.3d at 1004. 
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In this scenario, the sniff is the critical factor in satisfying probable 
cause. The police would likely concede that probable cause did not exist 
prior to the positive alert, and a court would likely justify the search 
almost exclusively based on that positive alert. Now assume that this dog 
and handler’s field accuracy rate is 50%.212 This court’s probable cause 
assessment would be greatly assisted if the court knew that probable 
cause requires a 35% probability, a 40% probability, a 50%, or a 51% 
probability of criminal activity. 
Accepting the field accuracy rate as the best evidence of the 
likelihood that drugs are in the vehicle, the court can compare the field 
accuracy rate to the assigned probable cause standard to determine if 
probable cause is met solely based on the positive alert. Courts make this 
comparison already.213 Courts holding that the accuracy rates of certain 
devices are sufficient to satisfy probable cause must have some fuzzy 
minimum threshold in their minds, but that number is not uniform and 
is usually not transparent to the citizenry, the police, or other courts. As 
one court held in the context of drug sniffing dogs, “based on historical 
performance, this dog’s alert suggested a 58% chance of finding a 
seizable quantity of drugs. While we hesitate to get into the business of 
affixing figures on probable cause, if we were pushed to do so we would 
hold this to be enough.”214 
This example demonstrates a situation where many of the objections 
to quantifying the probable cause standard are overblown. When the 
evidence in favor of suspicion is already quantified in a form that directly 
translates into the probable cause question,215 it seems silly to doggedly 
contend that probable cause is incapable of quantification. Although 
some scholars have argued that “using math to enlighten discussions of 
probable cause”216 gives the illusion of precision, the sense of precision 
gleaned from quantifying probable cause is no longer false when field 
accuracy rates are collected and calculated correctly. Further, the 
concern that assigning a minimum probable cause probability will cause 
courts to give undue weight to probabilistic evidence over nonscientific 
or case-specific evidence is greatly diminished in cases where probable 
cause is satisfied based on quantifiable evidence.217 
 
212 For the difference between false positive rates and field accuracy rates, 
see supra Part III.B. 
213 United States v. Anderson, 367 Fed. App’x 30, 33 (11th Cir. 2010) (al-
lowing a 55% accuracy rate to satisfy probable cause); United States v. Koon Chung 
Wu, 217 Fed. App’x 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n accuracy rate of 60% is more 
than reliable enough for [the dog’s] alert to have established probable cause.”). 
214 United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 2011) (footnote 
omitted). 
215 For the form in which this evidence should be submitted, see supra Part III.B. 
216 Antkowiak, supra note 20, at 586 (arguing that “math seduces lawyers 
with the siren song of precision, certainty, and constancy”). 
217 Scholars have vigorously debated whether, in the context of jury trials, 
jurors give undue weight to probabilistic evidence, like the probability associated with 
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Moreover, in cases like the one presented above, even if there are 
other factors besides the quantified evidence that also create suspicion, 
these factors can be directly translated into the accuracy rate of the 
device. The qualitative evidence essentially becomes quantitative. Thus, if 
field statistics are collected in situations that closely resemble the case at 
issue,218 the court should not even factor in other suspicious behavior, 
like the failure to maintain eye contact with the police. The field accuracy 
rate will already reflect the fact that most suspects targeted for the drug 
sniff display some amount of suspicious behavior.219 
However, there will be instances where the data on field 
performance is not sufficiently numerous or specific to extrapolate the 
likelihood of criminal behavior from the field accuracy rate alone.220 In 
those cases, there is a legitimate concern that assigning probable cause a 
numerical value will cause a judge to nonetheless feel compelled to use 
the insufficient or inapposite accuracy rate to answer the probable cause 
inquiry. A more generalized version of this fear has been articled by 
Professor Orin Kerr, who contends that if probable cause is quantified 
into a hard number, judges will be less likely to heed their logical, yet 
unexpressed, intuitions and instincts about a case.221 
Professor Kerr uses an example of a fictional “scientific study by top 
Harvard scientists showing that marijuana can be found in 60 percent of 
Harvard dormitory rooms.”222 He argues that quantifying probable cause 
may stifle a judge’s intuition that the 60% suspicion created by the study, 
although a high enough percentage to satisfy probable cause, feels 
insufficient. This instinct is based on the subconscious but logical 
skepticism as to why additional evidence was not collected to rule out or 
place specific suspicion upon the particular dorm room that police 
sought to search.223 Instead of allowing judges to follow their intuitions 
 
a suspect’s DNA matching evidence left at a crime scene, at the expense of nonscien-
tific or circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Brenda Inman Rowe, Note, A Possible Solution 
for the Problem of Juries Slighting Nonscientific Evidence: A Bayesian-Like Judicial Instruction, 
24 Am. J. Crim. L. 541, 541–47 (1997) (“An important question in this age of increas-
ing use of scientific evidence in criminal trials is whether jurors consider scientific 
evidence to the exclusion, or near-exclusion, of nonscientific evidence.”); Brian C. 
Smith et al., Jurors’ Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 Law & Hum. Behav. 49, 54–78 
(1996) (concluding that mock jurors can reasonably assess probabilistic evidence). 
Some scholars have actually concluded that juries do not attach enough weight to 
probabilistic evidence over case-specific evidence. E.g., Julie A. Singer et al., The Im-
pact of DNA and Other Technology on the Criminal Justice System: Improvements and Compli-
cations, 17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 87, 108 (2007) (“[J]urors . . . . often seriously under-
estimate the weight of probabilistic evidence.”). 
218 See supra Part III.B for an example of this. 
219 See supra Part III.B. 
220 See supra Part III.C. for problems with measuring accuracy rates. 
221 Kerr, supra note 5, at 138–39 (explaining that not all instincts are emotional 
and illogical, and some may render the probable cause determination for accurate). 
222 Id. at 135. 
223 Id. at 138–139; see also David H. Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and 
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about information not provided to the courts, quantifying probable cause 
might compel a judge to simply hold that a 60% likelihood satisfies 
probable cause. 
Professor Kerr, however, does not address situations where 
individualized, quantifiable evidence is incorporated into the probable 
cause inquiry. His objection reflects the problems inherent in using 
group statistics instead of individualized suspicion to satisfy probable 
cause.224 Indeed, many of the objections to quantifying probable cause 
provide examples involving group probabilities where there is no 
individualized suspicion.225 These examples do not pertain to a situation 
where the quantifiable evidence is sufficiently particularized on its own to 
answer the probable cause inquiry. 
Yet, Professor Kerr’s objections may be valid even in cases where 
individualized suspicion is quantified. Professor Kerr explains that 
quantification of probable cause could provide a “fertile ground for 
cognitive biases,”226 such as the “representativeness heuristic,” or “the 
tendency to measure probability by reference to data that seem to 
resemble the probability to be estimated.”227 A judge may have some 
intuition, that she cannot express mathematically, that the statistical 
evidence tending toward suspicion has not been properly collected or 
calculated, but she may feel compelled to compare a 49% field accuracy 
rate presented to a 45% established hurdle and find that probable cause 
is satisfied. 
A thorough understanding of the issues at play would allow a judge 
to discount certain field accuracy rates as less relevant. For example, if a 
dog’s field accuracy rate is 60%, but a judge finds that the field accuracy 
data was measured in a way that was not specific enough, she can decide 
that she is confident enough in that data to allow it to satisfy a 40% 
probable cause hurdle, if probable cause is defined that way, but not a 
50% probable cause hurdle. Alternatively, judges need not accept all 
field accuracy rates as dispositive of probable cause if there is reason to 
doubt them. For example, a Massachusetts court of appeals upheld a trial 
court’s finding that a canine alert did not satisfy probable cause because 
the dog’s training was deficient in some areas, and because he had 
properly detected drugs only five or six times and had improperly alerted 
 
Other Stories, 1979 Ariz. St. L.J. 101 (1979). 
224 For the distinction between probabilities relevant to individualized sus-
picion and group probabilities, see supra Part I.D. 
225 Professor Joseph Grano has argued that probable cause should exist 
where police know that one of a group of ten people have committed a crime, be-
cause the 1/10 chance of criminality based on this group statistic “causes us to over-
look the success of the police in narrowing their investigation from the universe of all 
possible suspects, which may include much of the population, to ten individuals.” 
Grano, supra note 20, at 496. 
226 Kerr, supra note 5, at 132. 
227 Id. at 139. 
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to drugs twice.228 Defining the probable cause standard would likely not 
have affected this outcome, as there was so little data that the two false 
positives alarmed the judge. 
Moreover, judges are already finding probable cause based on field 
accuracy rates, often without fully assessing whether these accuracy rates 
can be extrapolated into the probable cause inquiry.229 A judge may just 
as easily harbor illogical intuitive views about a case, such as that certain 
investigative devices are nearly infallible and their positive alerts should 
always satisfy probable cause. Requiring quantifiable evidence and 
quantifying probable cause would undermine judges’ discretion to 
import their unfounded assumptions into a standardless probable cause 
inquiry. Quantifying probable cause when the evidence is already in 
probabilistic form would allow a good balance between judicial discretion 
and judicial transparency/uniformity. 
Of course, in cases where a field accuracy rate obviously exceeds the 
probable cause hurdle, assigning a numerical value to probable cause is 
less important. Judges do not need to know that a “fair probability”230 is 
48% in order to determine that probable cause is met by a drug sniffing 
dog with a properly calculated 90% field accuracy rate. However, the 
Supreme Court should reject the notion that probable cause cannot be 
defined numerically in anticipation of the marginal cases, which do exist, 
especially as more technology replaces traditional police work.231 Once 
the view that probable cause cannot be quantified is rejected, the 
Supreme Court could either allow lower courts to experiment with 
selecting a number before ultimately assigning one, or the Court could 
simply give guidance on what that number is when it confronts a 
probable cause case where the critical evidence is quantifiable. 
2. When Quantifiable Evidence Is Presented Alongside Other Factors 
When quantifiable evidence must be considered by a court alongside 
several other significant factors, assigning a numerical value to probable 
cause has a greater chance of distorting the probable cause inquiry. The 
concern that courts will overvalue probabilistic evidence becomes more 
salient when the probabilistic evidence is insufficient on its own to satisfy 
probable cause. However, assigning probable cause a numerical value 
would assist judges in understanding the significance of the quantifiable 
evidence and then determining how much more qualitative evidence is 
needed to cross the probable cause hurdle. 
 
228 Commonwealth v. Ramos, 894 N.E.2d 611, 613–14, 617 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008). 
229 See supra Part III. 
230 See supra Part I.A. 
231 See United States v. Sanchez-Tamayo, No. 1:10-CR-0532, 2011 WL 
7767740, *14 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (“Courts have held that an accuracy rate of approxi-
mately 50%–60% ‘in finding measurable amounts of drugs’ does not undermine the 
reliability of the K-9 to the extent of negating probable cause.” (quoting United States 
v. Anderson, 367 F. App’x 30, 33 (11th Cir. 2010))). 
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For example, consider a case where facial recognition technology’s 
accuracy rate is 42%. The police had a positive alert to a pedestrian by 
this technology, but the police also had reason to believe that this 
pedestrian was a wanted bank robber because he appears nervous and 
walks briskly past police officers. Assuming that a 42% likelihood of 
criminal activity is not sufficient to satisfy probable cause, assigning a 
numerical value to probable cause allows a judge to assess how closely the 
quantifiable evidence comes to being sufficient. The quantifiable 
evidence’s contribution to the probable cause inquiry can be resolved, 
and now it is up to the judge’s discretion and prior case law to determine 
if the qualitative factors pointing towards suspicion cross the probable 
cause threshold.232 Probable cause functions as more of a benchmark to 
guide judges. If probable cause is set at 60%, a judge will want to see a lot 
more qualitative evidence than if probable cause is set at 45%. 
In cases like these, it is important to note that any extra suspicion, 
like the suspect’s nervousness or brisk walking, may already be reflected 
in the accuracy rate of the facial recognition technology. Judges must be 
careful not to double count suspicion, which would occur if the statistical 
evidence collected on the facial recognition device already reflects the 
fact that most suspects targeted for use by the technology also appear 
nervous. However, if this technology is usually used on random 
individuals, or whenever a passerby resembles a wanted suspect without 
regard to whether he appears suspicious, then a judge should consider 
the suspect’s nervousness and brisk walking to augment the suspicion 
calculated by positive alert by facial recognition technology. This type of 
analysis also applies to drug sniffing dogs and all other technology whose 
accuracy is measured in the field. 
3. When All of the Evidence Is Qualitative 
When all of the evidence presented is qualitative, or when judges 
give little weight to the quantifiable evidence, courts should not feel 
compelled to use the percentage assigned to probable cause to dispose of 
the probable cause inquiry. However, assigning a numerical value to 
probable cause can still assist judges in making probable cause 
determinations, so long as they appreciate that this number serves only as 
a reference. 
This might occur in a case involving an informant with a track record 
that is reliable but that that does not reflect enough data points to be 
directly extrapolated into the probable cause inquiry. If the court 
determines based on experience, intuition, and prior case law that the 
 
232 The Daubert inquiry, although not necessary during the probable cause 
analysis, could serve as a model of how judges may conduct a flexible inquiry, examin-
ing several factors, some of which are quantifiable and some of which are not. See su-
pra Part III.C; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (apply-
ing Daubert “to the testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists” 
because Daubert’s inquiry is “flexible,” and some of its factors may be disregarded or 
given extra weight by judges). 
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informant’s statements are sufficiently corroborated by the police to 
satisfy probable cause, the court need not trouble itself with the actual 
quantum of suspicion assigned as a minimum value to probable cause.233 
Prior case law would control regardless of the likelihood assigned to 
probable cause. 
Yet, having some conception of the magnitude of the probable cause 
hurdle can assist judges in evaluating whether an informant’s testimony 
has met the standard. Without feeling bound by the number, or 
compelled to quantify the inquiry, a judge’s assessment of whether a 
unique set of facts satisfies probable cause may well change depending 
on whether probable cause is 30% or 50%. 
Alternatively, in cases where most or all of the evidence is qualitative, 
and assigning a precise number to probable cause is unhelpful, judges 
could conceptualize probable cause as a range, as Professor Bacigal 
proposes.234 This would alleviate some of the confusion surrounding 
probable cause, without fostering many of the cognitive biases that arise 
when flexible inquiries are made overly rigid. This range could place as 
its center the number assigned to probable cause for cases where 
quantifiable evidence is the critical factor demonstrating probable cause. 
When quantifiable evidence and unquantifiable evidence are both 
essential to the probable cause inquiry, or when all of the evidence is 
qualitative, flexibility in application of the probable cause standard is 
important. Quantifying probable cause may undermine this flexibility if 
judges ignore their intuitions or convert evidence that is not susceptible 
to quantification into fictional percentages. Courts must be advised about 
the pitfalls inherent in quantifying the standard. 
B. Selecting the Number 
The selection of the number associated with the probable cause 
hurdle will be a difficult endeavor. The number assigned must reflect the 
fact that probable cause balances the degree of suspicion at which law 
enforcement interests trump privacy interests.235 Additionally, the 
numerical threshold must be a percentage that judges can easily abstract 
and conceptualize in their minds. 
Although there is wide variance regarding what this percentage is, a 
significant number of courts and scholars assume that probable cause is 
within the 40% to 51% range.236 In case assigning probable cause a 
 
233 See United States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1121–22 (7th Cir. 2011) (up-
holding the search of defendant’s home where confidential informant’s direct obser-
vations of defendant and reliable track record compensated for the absence of detail 
provided by the informant). 
234 See Bacigal, supra note 20, at 338–39 (placing a “fair probability” within 
the 40% to 49% range). 
235 See supra Part I.A. 
236 See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Daniel A. Crane, Re-
thinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 347, 356 (2011) (“The Supreme Court 
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numerical value will dilute its power and mystery, and consequently the 
privacy protections that it affords, probable cause should be placed 
towards the higher end of this range. Many courts have assumed that 
probable cause does not require a preponderance of the evidence in 
favor of suspicion,237 but this standard can be conceptually helpful in 
selecting a benchmark. 
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, in contexts unrelated to 
probable cause, judges frequently apply the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard.238 This standard has an approximate numerical 
percentage of just above 50%; some describe it as akin to “[50%] and a 
feather,”239 others deem it to be 51%.240 One solution to assigning 
probable cause a number that is easy to conceptualize is to select the 
other side of the preponderance standard, so that probable cause is 
satisfied at just slightly lower than 50%. For courts, then, a “fair 
probability” would occur where the evidence tending towards suspicion is 
almost at the point where it is in equipoise, but may be slightly less. 
Because judges already have a sense of when evidence tips slightly above 
50%, they can also appreciate when evidence slips slightly below 50%, or 
the other side of the preponderance coin. 
Through the stages of review, slightly below 50% would be used as a 
benchmark. At the lowest level of the inquiry, an “officer of reasonable 
caution”241 must be able to believe that evidence of a crime would be 
found by at least 50% (this is, after all, what it usually means to have a 
belief), but a magistrate judge issuing a warrant or a court examining a 
warrantless search of an automobile would assign as the “fair 
probability”242 a value slightly below 50%. Alternatively, judges could 
place some band of error around 50% to determine whether a 
reasonable police officer could have considered the likelihood of 
 
has denied that probable cause is susceptible of ‘precise definition or quantification 
into percentages,’ but practitioners and commentators often understand it to lie in 
the 40–45 percent range.” (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)) 
(footnote omitted)). 
237 See supra note 62. 
238 For example, in Nix v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that courts 
should apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence test to the “inevitable discovery rule,” 
which allows the admission of evidence obtained after a Fourth Amendment violation 
if it would have been discovered eventually through lawful means. 467 U.S. 431, 444 
(1984) (“If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means . . . 
the evidence should be received.”). 
239 E.g., Gordon Shemin, Mercury Rising: The Omnibus Autism Proceeding and 
What Families Should Know Before Rushing Out of Vaccine Court, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 459, 
476 n.84 (2008). 
240 E.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic Hazards in the 
Workplace: Challenging the Myths of the Tort and Workers’ Compensation Systems, 60 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 843, 893 (1992). 
241 See supra Part I. 
242 Id. 
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criminal behavior to be 50%.243 Then, reviewing courts decide if there is a 
“substantial basis”244 for concluding that this threshold of slightly below 
50%, the inferiority of the evidence, is met. 
A serious consequence of assigning probable cause one particular 
percentage is that it will force courts to apply the same probable cause 
value regardless of the severity of the crime. The Court currently 
maintains, according to Professor Bacigal, “the fiction of one uniform 
definition of probable cause.”245 However, some justices and lower courts 
have insinuated that the probable cause standard should be a sliding 
scale, depending on the gravity of the offense.246 Justice Robert Jackson 
wrote in a dissenting opinion that 
[i]f we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the 
officers throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search 
every outgoing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use 
of the search. The officers might be unable to show probable cause 
for searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive 
hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, 
because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity 
if it was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious 
crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and 
universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a 
bootlegger.247 
There are important reasons why the probable cause hurdle should 
not vary depending on the severity of the crime uncovered. A variable 
probable cause standard might enable courts to use hindsight judgment 
to uphold or invalidate searches, depending on how severe the criminal 
activity ultimately turned out to be. Having probable cause depend on 
balancing the severity of the crime against the nature of the intrusion 
would also convert probable cause into a more general “reasonableness” 
standard, whose malleability is even more susceptible to manipulation 
based on the concerns of the day than the harder line of the probable 
cause standard.248 
 
243 An analogue occurs in the context of conditional probabilities, where 
evidence is probative only if a precondition is met. For example, the fact that a mur-
der victim cheated on the defendant is relevant to prove motive only if the defendant 
was aware of the cheating. In those cases, a judge will admit evidence of the cheating 
if a reasonable jury could have found that the defendant was aware of this fact by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 104(b). 
244 See supra Part I. 
245 Bacigal, supra note 20, at 323. 
246 See id. at 324 (quoting Judge Posner’s comment in Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 
F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985), that “probable cause—the area between bare suspi-
cion and virtual certainty—describes not a point but a zone, within which the graver 
the crime the more latitude the police must be allowed.”). 
247 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing). 
248 According to several scholars and one retired judge, “the malleable con-
cept of ‘reasonableness’ once unleashed from its textual moorings, found in the 
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There are also arguments for allowing flexibility in the probable 
cause hurdle depending on the nature of the crime, as Justice Jackson’s 
kidnapping example illustrates.249 However, if the Court wants the 
probable cause standard to vary depending on the situation, it should 
hold so explicitly, instead of purporting to apply a “single, familiar 
standard.”250 The Supreme Court should truly grapple with whether the 
severity of the crime should affect probable cause, instead of enabling 
courts to alter the standard at their discretion, without transparency.251 
C. Other Solutions 
There are, of course, other solutions to incorporating quantifiable 
evidence besides assigning a minimum percentage of suspicion necessary 
to satisfy probable cause. Courts could, for instance, assign maximum 
false positive error rates and conditions of usage in order to allow a 
positive alert to be relevant to the probable cause inquiry. Or, courts 
could simply mandate that the use of all devices that essentially replace 
police officers must be preceded by uniform, standardized training and 
testing. These solutions would enable a more rigorous probable cause 
inquiry to preclude what many courts are currently doing, which is 
presuming that positive alerts by particular devices and investigative 
techniques are sufficient, even in the absence of data, to satisfy probable 
cause. 
Alternatively, if the Supreme Court decides that courts require the 
flexibility to alter the probable cause standard depending on the severity 
or exigency of the crime, a range can be assigned to probable cause. 
Professor Ronald Bacigal proposes quantifying probable cause into a 
range of 40% to 49% for precisely this reason.252 Even providing a range 
to probable cause would add more uniformity to the inquiry and assist 
judges in better assessing quantifiable evidence presented as part of the 
probable cause inquiry. 
V. Conclusion 
As more quantifiable evidence is incorporated into the probable 
cause inquiry, courts must grapple seriously with how they assess that 
 
Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements, can all too quickly and un-
necessarily diminish the compass of liberty and privacy. What is ‘reasonable,’ after all, 
is subject to the fears and prejudices of the day.” Laurence A. Benner et al., Criminal 
Justice in the Supreme Court: An Analysis of United States Supreme Court Criminal and Habe-
as Corpus Decisions (October 2, 2000–September 30, 2001), 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 87, 187 
(2001). 
249 See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
250 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979). 
251 For an interesting proposal on how to incorporate crime severity into 
the probable cause analysis, see Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth 
Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (2011). 
252 See Bacigal, supra note 20, at 338–39. 
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evidence. Courts often make the mistake of presuming that certain 
fallible investigative devices are sufficient to establish probable cause 
without properly calculated evidence of their reliability. Or, if accuracy 
rates are admitted as evidence to demonstrate reliability, courts often do 
not understand how to evaluate these accuracy rates to best answer the 
probable cause question. This Article has endeavored to explain which 
types of evidence require accuracy rates, how to calculate and assess those 
accuracy rates, and finally how to approach the probable cause inquiry 
using quantifiable evidence. In the process, it has argued that probable 
cause should be assigned a numerical value in cases where quantifiable 
evidence is the critical basis on which probable cause is satisfied. 
 
